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Huge accounting firms, seeking to become one-stop shopping centers for clients,
wish to add legal services to the audit, tax, information consulting, financial
planning, litigation support, and other services they already provide-a
phenomenon known as multi-disciplinary practice (MDP). MDP can aggravate
problems already plaguing objectivity and independence in the auditing
profession. Theoretically, auditors must be objective and independent. However,
there is a large body of behavioral studies demonstrating that, overwhelmingly,
people tend to behave inequitably if it benefits them and they think they can get
away with it-a behavior known as the self-serving bias. Professor Prentice
examines the self-serving bias by surveying the literature from psychology,
decision theory, behavioral finance, and behavioral economics, and examines its
operation in relevant analogous fields, such as law, medicine, and investment
banking. Professor Prentice then applies what we know about the self-serving
bias to the special problems of auditors' mandatory objectivity and
independence. It turns out that auditors, no less than the rest of us, behave in
accordance with the self-serving bias: for example, they are reluctant to issue
qualified opinions and reluctant to refisse their clients' requests for improper
accounting treatment. Moreover, they are even more reluctant to act against the
interests of financially healthy clients and more likely to act in self-defensive
ways with respect tofinancially troubled clients. Professor Prentice concludes by
discussing appropriate SEC responses to the dangers created by the self-serving
bias in auditors who are subject to the exacerbating effects of an MDP.
* University Distinguished Teaching Professor and Ed & Molly Smith Centennial
Professor of Business Law, University of Texas at Austin.
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SECAND MDP
[Whenever individuals face tradeoffs between what is best for
themselves and what is morally correct, their perceptions of moral
correctness are likely to be biased in the direction of what is best for
themselves.... [fIt seems likely that the judgments of auditors, who
ostensibly represent the interests of the shareholders but are hired (and
fired) by the people they audit, are likely to be blinded to some degree
by the incentive for client retention.1
INTRODUCTION
The accounting and law professions are engaged in a struggle of potentially
epic proportions. 2 Huge accounting firms, seeking to become one-stop shopping
centers for clients, wish to add legal services to the audit, tax, information
consulting, financial planning, litigation support, and other services they already
provide. The legal profession is naturally not keen on this new development The
controversy over multi-disciplinary practice (MDP) is more than just a turf battle,
but it is largely a turf battle.4 While some lawyers view MDP as an inevitable
development, many decry the invasion of their territory as inconsistent with the
best interests of consumers of legal services, noting differences between the two
professions in ethical rules regarding confidentiality, privilege, conflict of interest,
fee-sharing, advertising, and the like.5 Accounting firms argue that the
I Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of
Self-Serving Bias, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 121-22 (1997).
2 A vivid example of the invasion by the large accounting firms into the realm of legal
services is Ernst & Young's recent raid of tax partners from King & Spalding. Because the
average King & Spalding equity partner made "only" $723,881 in 1998, the motive for the
switch was obvious. See Janet Conley, Ernst & Young Set to Hire Tax Lawyers, LEGAL
INTELLiGENCER, Oct. 7, 1999, at 4. Currently, Ernst & Young is simply financing the new law
firm, to be called McKee Nelson Ernst & Young, in a "special arrangement" Ernst & Young
expects the boundaries between the professions to be eliminated soon and wants to be in
position to offer "one-stop shopping." Tom Herman, Ernst & Young Will Finance Launch of
Law Firm in SpecialArrangement, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1999, at B 10.
3 After substantial dithering, the legal profession finally took a strong anti-MDP stand
when the American Bar Association's House of Delegates voted by a three-to-one margin on
July 11, 2000, to continue the ABA's ban on partnering with nonlawyers in MDP. ABA
Emphatically Rejects MDPs, NAT'L L.J., July 24, 2000, at A5.
4 W. William Hodes, Foreward: The Several Stances of the Modem American Lawyer, 47
KAN. L. REV. 777, 789 n.51 (1999) (referring to MDP as a "turf battle between accountants and
lawyers").
5 See N.Y. STATE BAR ASs'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMM=ITEE ON MuLTI-DIscIPuNARY
PRACrcE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 12-13 (1999) [hereinafter MDP REPORT]. See also
Lawrence J. Fox, New Firm: Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24, 2000, at A23
(decrying accounting profession's "contempt for [the legal] profession and its values"); John
Gibeaut, Squeeze Play, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 42,43 (noting that the essence of the conflict is
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convenience and cost savings of the one-stop shopping concept6 make this an
idea whose time has come in the United States, as it already has in much of the
rest of the world.7 Both sides are speaking out of their pocketbooks, 8 so it is
difficult to determine whose arguments to credit.
The MDP controversy has important ramifications for the viability of U.S.
financial markets, which is based importantly on accurate financial reporting,9
which, in turn, requires a reliable, objective, and independent auditing industry.10
"about the fundamental differences between the two professions: accountants' duty toward
objectivity and public disclosure of financial statements, and lawyers' obligations to act as
advocates and guard their clients' secrets"); Tia Breakley, Note, Multidisciplinary Practices:
Lawyers & Accountants under One Roof?, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 275,293-94 (discussing
an example of practical problems that can arise when lawyers and accountants have
intertwining relationships).
6 See MDP REPORT, supra note 5, at 11-12. See also Edward Brodsky, Accountants and
the Practice of Law, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 12, 1998, at 3 (summarizing arguments made on both
sides); Ginaluca Morello, Note, Big Six Accounting Firms Shop Worldwide for Law Firms:
Why Multi-Discipline Practices Should Be Permitted in the United States, 21 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 190,247-52 (1997) (arguing in favor of MDP); Michael Paul, Law Firms Shouldn't Be for
Lawyers Only, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1999, at A18 (arguing for the benefits of one-stop
shopping).
7 See MDP REPORT, supra note 5, at 36 (noting that Arthur Andersen had the goal of
becoming the largest law firm in the world by the year 2000, and in Europe the Big Five have
acquired or created their own law firms in most major markets, including France where KPMG
Fidal Pet Intemational is the largest law firm); Jonathan Ames, Partners Who Sleep with the
Enemy, INDEPENDENT (London), June 1, 1999, at 12 (noting the general acceptance of
multidisciplinary practice in Europe, Australia, and Canada); Rocco Cammarere, Invasion of
the MDPs, N.J. LAW., May 24, 1999, at I (noting a similar invasion in South America).
8 Ian Hay Davison, Let Lawyers into Our Firms, TIMES (London), July 30, 1998, at 30
("For accountants, it seems that the main reason for moving into legal services is fees.").
9 See Louis Lowenstein, Corporate Governance and the Voice of the Paparazzi (Working
Paper on file with author) [hereinafter Lowenstein, Paparazzi] ("Financial transparency does
not alone explain the high confidence of the [American] investing public, but it is the
cornerstone of all that follows").
10 As the Supreme Court has noted:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial status, the
independent auditor assumes apublic responsibility transcending any employment relationship
with the client The independent public accountant performing this special function owes
ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing
public. This "public watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total
independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984). See also BERNARD S.
BLACK, THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PRECONDmONS FOR STRONG STOCK MARKETS: THE
NONTRIVIALrIY OF SEcuRrrIEs LAW 11-12 (Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in
Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 179, Sept. 1999) (pointing out the importance of a
sophisticated accounting profession to the creation of reliable financial statements, which are, in
turn, necessary to the creation of an efficient stock market); Tamar Frankel, Accountants'
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Many observers are legitimately concerned that the objectivity and independence
of the audit industry are already imperiled, and that as audit work becomes the
mechanism by which Big Five firms increase revenue from other profit centers,
such as legal practice, they will be further weakened.
The controversy over MDP creates an opportunity to focus attention on the
question of whether ancillary activities undermine the objective audit function.
The accounting profession believes that there is no strong, credible evidence that
provision of consulting and other nonaudit services has created special
independence problems." However, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has tentatively concluded that the roles of auditors and lawyers are
incompatible under a single roof12 and called for research to examine the issue
Independence: The Recent Dilemma, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 261, 271 ("Investors who
cease to trust the informational integrity of particular issuers may cease to trust the integrity of
the entire markets. The available literature on public mania suggests as much"); David M.
Martin, An Effort to Deter Opinion Shopping, 14 J. CORP. L. 419, 421 (1988) (noting
importance of independent audit function in attaining the goal of full and fair audit disclosure);
Gary Orren, The Appearance Standard for Auditor Independence: What We Know and Should
Know, in AICPA, SERVING THE PUBLIC INTEREST: A NEW CONCEPrUAL FRAMEWORK FOR
AUDrrOR INDEPENDENCE app. A at 1 (1997) [hereinafter AICPA, WHITE PAPER] ("[I]f our
financial markets are to work properly, the public must have confidence in the integrity and
objectivity of auditors.").
High-quality audits do seem to help keep management honest. See, e.g., Mark L. DeFond
& James Jiambalvo, Factors Related to Auditor-Client Disagreements over Income-Increasing
Accounting Methods, 9 CONTEMP. ACCr. RES. 415,427 (1993) (finding that higher quality Big
Eight firms are more likely to disagree with management's proposed treatments than lower
quality firms); William R. Kinney, Jr. & Roger D. Martin, Does Auditing Reduce Bias in
Financial Reporting? A Review of.Audit-Related Adjustment Studies, 13 AUDIING: J. OF PRAC.
& THEORY, Spring 1994, at 149, 155 (finding in a study of over fifteen hundred audits that
auditor-induced adjustments directly reduced positive bias in pre-audit net earnings and net
assets numbers and improved the precision of measurement).
11 A prestigious consulting group commissioned by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) recently concluded that there was no major cause for concern.
LAW & ECON. CONSULTING GROUP, INC. (LECG), AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AUDrrOR
INDEPENDENCE FOR A MULTI-CLIENT, MULTI-SERVICE PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM (Oct 20,
1997) [hereinafter LECG], in AICPA, WHrm PAPER app. B at ii-iii, supra note 10.
12 Darryl Van Duch, SEC Opposes Legal Practice by Auditors, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 15, 1999,
at B1. In a letter to the American Bar Association's Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice,
Lynne E. Turner, the SEC's Chief Accountant observed that the "SEC's auditor independence
regulations specifically state that the roles of auditors and attorneys under the federal securities
laws are incompatible," citing Rule 2-01(c) of Regulation S-X, 17 CFR § 210.2-01(c). Letter
from Lynne E. Turner, SEC Chief Accountant, to ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice (Jan. 22, 1999), at http'/www.abanetorgcpr/tumer.html (on file with The Ohio State
Law Journal).
The SEC has previously taken action against auditors who acted simultaneously as their
client's attorney. See, e.g., In re Samuel George Greenspan, Accounting and Enforcement No.
312, 50 SEC 672 (1991) (noting that legal counsel and their clients enter into a personal
2000]
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more thoroughly. 13 In response to that call, this article examines a wide-ranging
set of behavioral studies and argues that the SEC is correct to view the marriage
of auditors and lawyers with a jaundiced eye.14
Consider that in one recent laboratory study, auditors reviewed a number of
sets of real financial statements and recommended going concern qualifications
for 36% of them; yet in real life none of the statements had been qualified.15
What accounts for this? What happens between the intellectual conclusion that a
qualified opinion should issue and the real-life business decision not to issue
one? 16
Theoretically, auditors must be objective and independent.17 Yet, constraints
imposed by human nature mean they will have great difficulty being either
objective or independent when compensated by the client they are auditing.18 The
relationship with the client of the type that necessarily appears inconsistent with the appearance
of independence required of auditors).
13 On August 15, 1999, the Commission's Chief Accountant, Lynne E. Turner, issued to
the American Accounting Association a "Call for Academic Research on Key Accounting
Issues," including independence issues arising from the nonaudit services that accounting firms
now offer audit clients. See Lynne E. Turner, Call for Academic Research on Key Accounting
Issues (Aug. 15, 1999), at http/www.sec.gov/news/extra/aaacall.htm (on file with The Ohio
State Law Journal). See generally John Gibeaut, MDP in SEC Crosshairs: Accounting Firms
May Cool Their Urge to Merge, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2000, at 16 (describing SEC Concerns).
14 It is only the audit function of modem accounting that is inappropriate for linkage with
the practice of law. The desirability of allowing accountants involved in other realms (tax,
consulting, financial planning, etc.) to practice law is beyond the scope of this article.
15 Sam Campisi & Ken T. Trotman, Auditor Consensus in Going Concern Judgments, 15
Accr. & Bus. REs. 303,309 (Autumn 1985).
16 The General Accounting Office has recently asked a similar question: Why, despite
recent increases in financial fraud and questionable accounting, were only six Section 10A
reports filed during the first four years of the existence of the whistleblower provisions of the
1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). PSLRA, 109 Stat. 737 (current
version with additions and amendments at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (Supp. I
1995)). The PSLRA imposed upon auditors a duty to "blow the whistle" on client fraud by
filing reports with the SEC if the client did not turn itself in, yet all six registrants named in the
filed reports are subject to active SEC enforcement actions. Ronald Taylor, SECIs Considering
Three Cases for Section 10OA Enforcement, BNA SECuRmEs LAW DAILY, Feb. 25, 2000,
available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNASLD File.
17 An auditor who is not independent may well choose to act "in a technically incompetent
fashion." Peter Moizer, Independence, in CVRRENT IssuEs IN AuDnNG 33 (D. Kent et al. eds.,
1985).
18 One observer notes:
The key to investor confidence in auditor opinions is the independence of the auditor. It is
ironic, then, that the very firm subject to the audit both selects and compensates the auditor.
Because auditors can be replaced at any time and for virtually any reason (or for no reason at
all), an inherent conflict of interest exists. The auditor is professionally concerned with
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difficulty is exacerbated when the auditors' firms gain substantial income from
the audit client by selling nonaudit services, such as legal services. 19
A growing body of behavioral research indicates that acting contrary to one's
self interest is not a natural or easy thing. It is not just that people consciously say:
"I'm looking out for me; screw the other guy," although they sometimes do.20
Rather, a menu of cognitive biases and limits on rationality affect how people
perceive,21 process,2 2 and remember23 information, and, consequently, how they
choose among alternative actions, assess risk, and make many other types of
decisions.24 Many of these biases and limitations are shaped by a self-serving bias
that encompasses a number of psychological phenomena. According to Kaplan
and Ruffle, "[a] self-serving bias exists where an individual's preferences affect
rendering a truly independent assessment of the client's accounting treatment, yet he is also
dependent on the client's satisfaction for continued audit revenue.
Dale R. Rietberg, Note, Auditor Changes and Opinion Shopping-A Proposed Solution, 22 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 211,213-14 (1988).
19 See Moizer, supra note 17, at 38 ("The provision of ... non-audit services clearly
increases the size of the audit firm's economic interest in the client. The potential loss of
revenues from losing a client could, therefore, be much larger than the value of the audit fee
alone.").
This is not a concern strictly related to auditors. Hayward and Boeker recently noted in a
study regarding financial analysts that lawyers, consultants, accountants, and even journalists
must be concerned with conflicts of interest and posited that "as professional service firms
expand and diversify their range of services and their client base, such conflicts become more
pervasive." Mathew LA. Hayward & Warren Boeker, Power and Conflicts of Interest in
Professional Firms: Evidencefirom Investment Banking, 43 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 1, 1 (1998).
20 See Moizer, supra note 17, at 35 ("Perhaps a more realistic view of human nature is that
individuals start from a position of wanting to give an honest opinion but that this wish is
counterbalanced by a desire to maximize their own self-interest").
21 Donald C. Langevcort, OrganizedIllusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 144
(1997) ("When there is enough ambiguity to permit it, people naturally 'see what they want to
see."); J. Edward Russo et al., The Distortion of Information During Decisions, 66 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 102, 102 (1996) ("People seek information that
confirms their choice and depreciate encountered information that opposes it.").
22 George Loewenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory and Business Ethics: Skewed Trade-
Offs between Self and Others, in CODES OF CONDUCr 214,221 (David M. Messick & Ann E.
Tenbreusel eds., 1996) (observing that "[o]ne of the most important nonobjective influences on
information processing is self-interest.").
23 E.g., Elisha Babad, Wishful Thinking among Voters: Motivational and Cognitive
Influences, 9 INT'L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 105, 105 (1997) [hereinafter Babad, Wishful Thinking]
(finding that voters' memories of poll results that they had seen were influenced by their
candidate preference).
24 See generally ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1988)
(explaining generally human limits on rational decision-making); SCOTr PLOUS, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISIONMAKING (1993) (same).
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his beliefs in an optimistic direction, one favoring his own payoff"25 The bias is
pervasive and strong, and its implications indicate that the SEC is wise to
maintain its vigilance.
Part I gives a brief primer on the self-serving bias by exploring literature from
relevant fields, such as psychology, decision theory, behavioral finance, and
behavioral economics. Part II examines the operation of the self-serving bias in
relevant analogous fields, such as law, medicine, and investment banking. Part III
looks at the audit profession specifically.26 If the self-serving bias affects auditors,
various patterns of behavior should appear. For example, the self-serving bias
literature predicts that auditors should be reluctant to issue qualified opinions
regarding their clients, reluctant to refuse their clients' requests for improper
accounting treatment, and reluctant to drop clients seeking such improper
treatment for fear of imperiling a stream of revenue. As the stream of revenue
from specific clients increases, whether through audit fees or nonaudit revenue,
these effects should increase. They should also increase if the client is relatively
healthy financially and therefore unlikely to go bankrupt because bad auditing
will seldom come to light if the client prospers. On the other hand, as the client's
financial situation weakens and the likelihood of litigation against the auditor
rises, the scales should tip. It should be to the auditor's self-interest to more
readily qualify the opinions and/or drop the clients, and auditors should react
accordingly. Not to spoil the surprise, but numerous studies of auditors
demonstrate these effects. Finally, Part IV discusses appropriate SEC responses to
the dangers created by the self-serving bias in auditors.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SELF-SERVING BIAs
A. Conscious Self-Serving Actions
People tend to do what they think is in their own best interest.27 Altruism
exists, but there is distressingly little of it in the world.28 Evidence indicates that
25 Todd R. Kaplan & Bradley J. Ruffle, Correspondence, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 243, 243
(1998).
26 Infra notes 149 to 281 and accompanying text.
27 See Linda J. Keil & Charles G. McClintock, A Developmental Perspective on
Distributive Justice, in EQUriY THEORY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
13, 19 (David M. Messick & Karen S. Cook eds., 1983) [hereinafter EQurlY THEORY] ("lit is
safe to assume that humans are generally motivated to maximize their own gain."); ELAINE
WALsTER Er AL., EQUITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH 6-7 (1978) ("Even the most contentious
scientist would find it difficult to challenge [the] proposition" that "[i]ndividuals will try to
maximize their outcomes.").
28 Jane B. Baron, Gijs, Bargains, andForm, 64 IND. LJ. 155, 184 (1989) (noting that the
rarity of personal altruism, as distinguished from business bargains, justifies scrutiny of the
enforceability of promises prompted by affection); Loewenstein, Skewed Trade-Offs, supra
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people tend to behave inequitably if it benefits them and they think they can get
away with it,29 and that people will present themselves in the best light when it is
possible to do so.30
There is, thankfully, some evidence indicating that ethical standards and
moral codes can impact human behavior.31 Regrettably, there is also evidence
that their impact is weak and inconsistent.32 Although there is substantial truth in
Hausman and McPherson's assertion that "[t]he morality of economic agents
influences their behavior and hence influences economic outcomes,"33 it is also
true that a recent study of corporate financial disclosure found a high occurrence
of fraudulent reporting and that neither personal values of corporate officers,
note 22, at 216 ("Recent empirical investigations of altruism have found it to be a surprisingly
weak force in human decision-making."); SJ. Stoljar, A Rationale of Gifts and Favours, 19
MOD. L. REv. 237, 249 (1956) ("[P]ersonal altruism is rare and from strangers even rarer.");
WALSTE AL, supra note 27, at 100-01 (noting that a "few scientists believe that man does
act unselfishly under very special circumstances," but that "[t]he vast majority of scientists,
however, are cynical[,] ... interpret[ing] altruism in calculating terms").
This is certainly not to say that there is no altruism. See, e.g., BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE
NONPROFrr ECONOMY 132 (1988) (estimating that there is $74 billion worth of voluntary labor
performed in the U.S. annually); Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal
Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1662 (1998) (noting the existence of "dutiful altruism," as
when children take care of aged parents they dislike); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness
into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1281 (1993) (noting the
economic implications of altruism, including, for example, the notion that "[i]f an employee has
been exceptionally loyal, then a manager may feel some obligation to treat that employee well,
even when it is not in his economic self-interest to do so.").
29 Elaine Walster et al., New Directions in Equity Research, 25 J. PERsONAUTY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 151, 153 n.5 (1973).
30 Robert M. Arkin et al., Social Anxiety, Self-Presentation, and the Self-Serving Bias in
CausalAttribution, 38 J. PERsONALriY& Soc. PSYCHOL. 23,34 (1980).
31 See David M. Messick & Keith Sentis, Fairness, Preference, and Fairness Biases, in
EQUiTYTHEORY, supra note 27, at 79 [hereinafter Messick & Sentis, Fairness Biases] (noting a
study where subjects could have, but did not, keep all of a sum of money for themselves. They
instead shared it in a self-serving manner, indicating support for their belief that "behavior is a
compromise between egotistical impulses and ethical standards."); Eric Noreen, The Economics
of Ethics: A New Perspective on Agency Theory, 13 ACcr., ORGs. & Soc'y 359, 359 (1988)
("Casual observation suggests that while there may be some people who are unreservedly
opportunistic, others do constrain their own behavior out of an ethical sensibility or
conscience.').
3 2 See Noreen, supra note 31, at 367 ('Behavioral norms (or ethical rules) are clearly a
most fragile enforcement mechanism.").
3 3 Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics
and Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 31 J. ECON. LrERATURE 671, 673 (1993).
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codes of conduct of their firms, nor the interaction of the two played a significant
role in minimizing that fraud.34
B. Self-Serving Biases
Man should not be characterized as egregiously biased or opportunistic.
Kagan notes that "[t]he number of acts of rudeness, vandalism, theft, abuse, rape,
and murder that occurred yesterday, throughout the world, is infinitesimal when
compared with the total number of opportunities each adult had to display any
one of these behaviors."35 Nonetheless, humans have a pervasive tendency to act
in a way they perceive as consistent with their own best interests. Although
cognitive limitations, such as bounded rationality,3 6 prevent humans' behavior
from being especially efficient in this regard, this tendency is very strong for
reasons that go well beyond the conscious desire to benefit one's self at others'
expense. The causal factors are a deliciously complex blend of cognitive
limitations and motivational drives.
Consider, for example, a team of employees who worked together to
complete successfully an important project. Assume that the boss calls one of the
employees into her office and says: "I intend to promote the team member who
contributed the most to the group's overall success. Would it be fair to say that
you are that team member?" Studies show that the employee being quizzed will
have a strong tendency to conclude that he is indeed the employee who should be
promoted. Causal attribution theory demonstrates that people tend to assign to
themselves more responsibility for their group's successes and less for its
failures. 37 More generally, people tend, through this self-attribution bias, to
attribute their successes in life to their own skills and abilities and their failures to
34 Arthur P. Brief et al., What's Wrong with the Treadway Commission Report?
Experimental Analyses of the Effects of Personal Values and Codes of Conduct on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting, 15 J. BUS. ETHICS 183, 192 (1996); see also Loewenstein, Skewed Trade-
Offs, supra note 22, at 215 (concluding that "[managers] put very little weight on the effect of
their decisions on other parties, except insofar as those effects have repercussions for their own
well-being").
35 JEROME KAGAN, THREE SEDUCIVE IDEAS 192 (1998). Kagan also notes that "[a]fter we
have protected ourselves from actual or possible harm, the affirmation of virtue takes
precedence over the search for sensory pleasure most of every day." Id at 153.
36 
"Bounded rationality" is the notion that human cognitive abilities are not infinite, and
that humans must often make decisions in the absence of perfect information or perfect
understanding of the information they do have. See generally HERBERT A. SIMON,
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR xxiv (2d ed. 1957) (noting that people are "intendedly rational, but
only limitedly so."); James G. March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of
Choice, 9 BELLJ. ECON. 587, 590 (1978).
37 See Barry R. Schlenker & Rowland S. Miller, Egocentrism in Groups: Self-Serving
Biases or Logical Information Processing?, 35 J. PERsONALrIY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 755, 762-63
(1977).
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outside factors.38 This is among "the best established, most often replicated,
findings in social psychology." 39
This hypothetical team member may wish to be objective about his
contribution, but he will have difficulty doing so because the self-serving bias
affects not only causal attribution, but also many other aspects of judgment,40
including those related to fairness. People may wish to judge objectively the
evidence regarding their contributions, but it is not that easy to do so, thanks to
38 See MAx BAZEMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 96 (4th ed. 1998)
[hereinafter BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT] (noting President Kennedy's famous quote: "Victory has a
thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan"); Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff Greenberg, Toward an
Integration of Cognitive and Motivational Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased
Hypothesis-Testing Model, 20 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297, 298 (1987)
(noting the "well-replicated finding that people tend to make dispositional attributions for their
successes and situational attributions for their failures.").
This phenomenon holds in matters of sexual relations and, not surprising to many, men are
more likely to use self-serving attributions of causation for an unsatisfactory sexual experience
than are women. Anne Maass & Chiara Volpato, Gender Differences in Self-Serving
Attributions About Sexual Experiences, 19 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 517, 535 (1989). It holds
in matters of sports performance. See, eg., Peter E. De Michele et a., Success and Failure of
Wrestlers: Further Evidence of the Self-Serving Bias, 21 J. SPORT BEHAV. 242, 250-51 (1998)
(finding strong evidence of the self-serving bias among college wrestlers); Victor L. Santamaria
& David M. Furst, Distance Runners' Causal Attributions for Most Successful and Least
SuccessfulRaces, 17 J. SPORT BEHAV. 43, 43 (Mar. 1994) (finding that distance-runner subjects
gave more internal attributions for their most successful races than for least successful races). It
also holds in matters of the stock market. Kent Daniel et al., Investor Psychology and Security
Market Under- and Over-Reactions, 53 J. FIN. 1839, 1844-45 (1998) (arguing that stock
analysts and investors suffer from a combination of overconfidence and the self-attribution
bias).
3 9 Michael Ross & Garth J.O. Fletcher, Attribution and Social Perception, in 2 THE
HANDBOOK OF SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY 79, 104 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson eds., 3d ed. 1985).
40 James Madison recognized that politicians' view of the public interest will be swayed
by their self-interest even if they are well intentioned because a politician's "opinions and his
passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other, and the former will be objects to which
the latter will attach themselves." TiE FEDERALIsT No. 10, at 43 (James Madison) (Garry Wills
ed., 1982).
Studies have shown that peer-company stock-retum benchmarks chosen by corporate
managers tend to be downward biased, making the managers' performance look better by
comparison. Wilbum Lewellen et al., Self-Serving Behavior in Managers' Discretionay
Information Disclosure Decisions, 21 J. Accr. & ECON. 227, 249 (1996). In addition, studies
show that parties engaged in school district negotiations are biased in which districts they
choose as "comparable." Linda Babcock et al., Choosing the Wrong Pond: Social Comparisons
in Negotiations that Reflect a Self-Serving Bias, 111 Q. J. ECON. 1, 1 (1996). But see Gordon B.
Dahl & Michael R. Ranson, Does Where You Stand Depend on Where You Sit? Tithing
Donations and Self-Serving Beliefs, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 703, 704 (1999) (finding less evidence
of self-serving bias in how Mormons defined income for purposes of tithing than has generally
been found in studies of the self-serving bias in other contexts).
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the self-serving bias.41 Messick and Sentis note that equality is the core of the
human concept of fairness, but that "there is a fundamental asymmetry in one's
ability to make the kind of equality judgment that fairness requires."42 Thus,
while humans have a well-developed sense of fairness that affects both their
opinions and actions4 3 their desire to act fairly 44 is often frustrated by the self-
serving bias. 45 "[P]eople tend to conflate what is personally beneficial with what
is fair or moral."'46 Thus, even the judgment of an auditor who truly wishes to
fairly evaluate a client's financial reports will inevitably be adversely affected by
41 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 1471, 1501 (1998) ("[P]arties may tend to see things in the light most favorable to them;
while people care about fairness, their assessments of fairness are distorted by their own self-
interest. This is a form of bounded rationality--specifically, a judgment error, people's
perceptions are distorted by the self-serving bias.").
4 2 Messick & Sentis, Fairness Biases, supra note 3 1, at 69.
4 3 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus.
S285, S299 (1986) (noting that the standard rational economic actor model is deficient for
failing to take into account the preference people have for being treated fairly and for treating
others fairly); Rabin, supra note 28, at 1281 (exploring economic implications of evidence from
psychology that "[i]f somebody is nice to you, fairness dictates that you be nice to him. If
somebody is being mean to you, fairness allows-and vindictiveness dictates-that you be
mean to him."). It has been noted that this concern with fair treatment is part of a broader
phenomenon known as "bounded self-interest." Jolls et al., supra note 41, at 1479.
44 There is no doubt that this general desire is bounded. For example, "[s]everal theorists
have noticed that those who materially benefit from inequity are more tolerant of injustice than
those who are deprived." WALSTER ET AL., supra note 27, at 43.
4 5 As Bazerman notes:
People frequently have the goal of reaching a fair solution. However, assessments of what
is fair are often biased by self-interest. For example, it is common for all parties in a conflict to
suggest viable, but self-serving, solutions, and then to justify them based on abstract fairness
criteria. Egocentrism works to make everyone believe that it is honestly fair for them to have
more of the resource than an independent advisor would judge. The problem lies not in our
desire to be unfair but in our inability to interpret information in an unbiased manner.
BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT, supra note 38, at 99-100.
46 Loewenstein, Skewed Trade-Offs, supra note 22, at 221. See also Linda Babcock et al.,
Biased Judgments ofFairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337, 1341 (1995) (reporting
results indicating systematic self-serving biases in judgments of fairness that affect settlement
negotiations in litigation and other bargaining contexts); Messick & Sentis, Fairness Biases,
supra note 31, at 61, 70-71 (noting that "there may be systematic biases that influence one's
perceptions or judgments of fairness" and reporting studies demonstrating that an "egocentric
bias ... [is] a tendency for subjects to judge more money to be fair for themselves than for
another in the same situation"); David M. Messick & Keith P. Sentis, Fairness and Preference,
15 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 418, 432, 434 (1979) [hereinafter Messick & Sentis,
Fairness and Preference] (reporting results of study finding an egocentric bias in fairness
judgments and noting that "people are capable of ignoring or compromising what they know to
be ethically correct in order to achieve a hedonically more preferred outcome").
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the auditor's self-serving desire to keep the client's stream of revenues, unless the
risk of adverse consequences stemming from inaccurate reporting is sufficient
and immediate.
Causes of the self-serving bias are both cognitive and motivational, and to
fully tease one out from the other is impossible. Clearly the two reinforce one
another4 7
1. Cognitive Effects
To address cognitive causes first, Thompson and Loewenstein suggest three
cognitive mechanisms to explain why judgments of fairness are biased in a self-
serving direction, causing our hypothetical employee likely to conclude that he is
the team member most deserving of the raise4 8 First, they note that people
perceive and encode information in a biased manner4 9 A classic study found that
that students who watched film of a football game had dramatically different
views of the violations committed during the game. Princeton students thought the
4 7 The Schlenker and Miller study was unable to determine whether the effect was
primarily a result of perceptual biases (subjects tended to remember themselves as truly having
more to do with successful outcomes) or self-presentational effects (subjects sought to improve
their image) or a combination of both. Schlenker & Miller, supra note 37, at 762. This issue is
unresolved. See generally Gifford Weary Bradley, Self-Serving Biases in the Attribution
Process: A Reexamination of the Fact or Fiction Question, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 56, 68-69 (1978) (finding evidence for at least a partially-motivational explanation
for people's tendency to accept responsibility for positive outcomes and to deny responsibility
for negative outcomes and concluding that it is largely a matter of self-presentation); Dale T.
Miller, Nhat Constitutes a Self-Serving Attributional Bias? A Reply to Bradley, 36
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1221, 1222 (1978) (finding little evidence that people alter
their perceptions of causality to protect their self-esteem, but admitting to evidence that people
often alter their description of causality in order to do so); Dale T. Miller & Michael Ross, Self-
Serving Biases in the Attribution of Causality: Fact or Fiction, 82 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 213, 223-
24 (1975) (evaluating existing evidence as supporting a cognitive explanation for this
phenomenon); Tom Pyszczynski et al., Maintaining Consistency between Self-Serving Beliefs
and Available Data: A Bias in Information Evaluation, 11 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 179, 185-88 (1985) (concluding that both cognitive and motivational forces accounted
for the fact that students who thought they had done well on a social sensitivity test found more
persuasive articles favoring the validity of the test and students who thought they had done
poorly on the test found more persuasive articles arguing that the test had low validity);
Pyszczynski & Greenberg, supra note 38, at 332-34 (suggesting a model reflecting how
motivations affect cognitive perceptions, with both factors working together to influence in a
self-serving way humans' causal attributions).
48 Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and
Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCEssES 176, 180-81 (1992).
Although these observations are tied specifically to judgments of faimess, they similarly impact
other types of decisions.
49 Id.
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Dartmouth team committed twice as many flagrant penalties and three times as
many mild penalties as the Princeton team, whereas Dartmouth students thought
each team had committed approximately the same number of penalties 50
Reflective sports fans can identify easily with this tendency to see what they wish
to see. Another example is the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debate, where viewers who
were pro-Kennedy tended to perceive that he won the debate while viewers who
were pro-Nixon tended to think that Kennedy lost.51
Second, Thompson and Loewenstein note that selective recall can impact
fairness judgments.52 If you ask basketball players about their games, they will
usually report that the turning points were keyed by their teammates' actions
rather than actions of the players on the other team.53 Studies indicate that if you
ask most married couples what percentage of the housework they do, the numbers
you get back will add up to more than one hundred percent.54 Similarly, as noted
earlier, members of organizations tend to overvalue their contributions to its
success,55 perhaps because they can remember their own actions more clearly
than those of their colleagues. Taylor has studied the phenomenon of "egocentric
recall," the ability to bring to mind one's own contributions somewhat better than
those of another person.56 Thompson and Loewenstein have documented a self-
50 Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 129, 131 (1954).
51 David 0. Sears & Rochard E. Whitney, Political Persuasion, in HANDBOOK OF
COMMuNICATION 253, 255 (Ithiel de Sola Pool et al. eds., 1973) ("The major effect was that
partisans thought their own candidate won the debate.").
52 Thompson & Loewenstein, supra note 48, at 180.
53 Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEuRIsTICs AND BIASEs 179, 186 (Daniel Kahneman ed.,
1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY].
54 Id. at 184. The authors conclude that their research "demonstrates the prevalence of
self-centered biases in availability and judgments of responsibility." Id at 189.
55 See BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT, supra note 38, at 98-99 ("Positive illusions lead
organizational members to claim an inappropriately large proportion of the credit for positive
outcomes, to overestimate their value to the organization, and to set objectives that have little
chance of success.").
56 Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 53, at 190, 195 (noting that egocentric recall is a
manifestation of the well-known "availability bias," the tendency to remember certain things
more clearly than others because of their recency, vividness, or other characteristics).
This self-serving memory bias is exacerbated by the fact that people, in part because of the
overconfidence bias, tend to believe that their memories are better than they truly are and that
false memories are accurate. See Jonathan B. Holmes et al., The Phenomenology of False
Memories: Episodic Content and Confidence, 24 J. EXPERIMENTAL PsYCHOL. 1026, 1027
(1998) (finding that people "often rate their false memories with high degrees of confidence,
indicating a firm belief in their false memories."); Rand J. Spiro, Accommodative
Reconstruction in Prose Recall, 19 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAv. 84, 94 (1980)
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serving bias regarding fairness judgments in negotiation and have shown that
negotiators tended to recall information that favored their position more than
information that did not favor their position.57 It is not just that the memory
selects certain self-serving facts to recall while ignoring others; it also massages
the facts in a self-serving way. For example, Fischoff and Beyth, in studying the
hindsight bias,58 found that students remembered having made more accurate
predictions of an event in an earlier study than they truly had.59
Finally, Thompson and Loewenstein note the phenomenon of differential
weighting of information, the fact that we tend to perceive information that favors
our preferred position as more important than information that undermines our
preferred position.60 Messick and Sentis studied perceptions of fairness and asked
subjects who had worked either seven or ten hours at a task how much a person
who worked ten hours should be paid if the person who worked seven hours was
paid $25. Subjects who had worked seven hours thought (on average) that $30.29
was the right payment, but those who had worked ten hours thought $35.24 was
the fair amount.61 Cook and Yamagishi have also performed a study supporting
the notion that people who have put more effort into a task tend to think that effort
is the touchstone for compensation, whereas those who have put less effort into
the task think that equality is the more important factor.62
Although Thompson and Loewenstein were analyzing fairness judgments,
these same cognitive factors should similarly impact other types of judgments as
well.
2. Motivational Factors
Clearly the human tendency to act in one's own best interest contains a
cognitive component. But that component is strongly shaped and supplemented
by motivational factors, both conscious and unconscious. The conscious part is
obvious--some people would lie, cheat, and steal in order to get a ten thousand
(finding that subjects were more confident in their recall of events that did not happen than of
events that did).
57 Thompson & Loewenstein, supra note 48, at 189-90.
5 8 The hindsight bias causes people who know how an event turned out to falsely
overestimate the probability with which they would have predicted it beforehand. See generally
DAWES, supra note 24, at 119-20; PLOUS, supra note 24, at 35-37.
59 Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, "I Knew It Would Happen "--Remembered
Probabilities of Once-Future Things, 13 ORG. BEHAv. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 1, 13 (1975).
60 Thompson & Loewenstein, supra note 48, at 180-81.
61 Messick & Sentis, Fairness and Preference, supra note 46, at 425-30 (concluding that
"there is clear evidence of an egocentric bias in [the] fairness judgments").
62 See Karen S. Cook & Toshio Yamagishi, Social Determinants of Equity Judgments:
The Problem ofMultidimensional Input, in EQUrrY THEORY, supra note 27, at 95, 122-23.
2000]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
dollars annual raise. However, more people would honestly conclude, in part
because they were psychologically motivated to do so, that they truly were the
ones to deserve the promotion. While the line between conscious self-serving
actions and actions unconsciously influenced in a self-serving direction is unclear,
the end result is often the same.63
Individuals have a psychological need to feel good about themselves and to
feel good about their futures. As noted above, this need motivates them to
attribute causality in a self-serving manner.64 It motivates them to describe
successful people in ways that closely resemble themselves.65 It also motivates
them to exhibit overconfidence and overoptimism biases. 66 Overconfidence and
overoptimism are generally good for people's mental health,67 but can cause them
to make serious errors ofjudgment
People tend to be overconfident in a wide variety of settings68 and think that
they are better at doing most things than they really are.69 For example, studies
63 See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of
Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 375,428 n.120 (1997).
64 See Paul Rosenfeld, Self-Esteem and Impression Management Explanations for Self-
Serving Biases, 130 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 495, 495 (1990) (finding that the need for self-esteem,
more than impression management, underlies the tendency to attribute success to intemal
factors and failure to extemal factors).
65 David Dunning et al., A New Look at Motivated Inference: Are Self-Serving Theories of
Success a Product of Motivational Forces?, 69 J. PERsoNALrIY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 58, 65
(1995) (reporting on three studies providing evidence that "egocentric definitions of success are,
indeed, prompted by the motive to maintain positive images of self").
6 6 Overoptimism or "wishful thinking can be considered as a type of self-serving bias, and
it can be accounted for by similar explanations as other self-serving biases in social
psychology." Babad, Wishful Thinking, supra note 23, at 106.
67 Studies show that the only people who have an objective view of themselves are those
who tend toward clinical depression and other mental problems. See Shelley E. Taylor &
Jonathon D. Brown, llusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental
Health, 103 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 193, 204-05 (1988) (finding that overoptimism and unrealistic
self-confidence are highly adaptive mechanisms allowing people to be happy and that people
who are more realistic in their assessment of themselves and the world around them tend
toward depression).
68 Gilovich notes:
[A] large majority of the general public think[s] that they are more intelligent more fair-
minded, less prejudiced, and more skilled behind the wheel of an automobile than the average
person. This phenomenon is so reliable and ubiquitous that it has come to be known at the
"Lake Wobegon effect," after Garrison Keillor's fictional community where "the women are
strong, the men are good-looking, and all the children are above average." A survey of one
million high school seniors found that 70% thought they were above average in leadership
ability, and only 2% thought they were below average. In terms of ability to get along with
others, all students thought they were above average, 60% thought they were in the top 10%,
and 25% thought they were in the top 1%! Lest one think that such inflated self-assessments
occur only in the minds of callow high-school students, it should be pointed out that a survey of
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have shown that most people believe that they are above average drivers,70 even
after they have been in a serious accident.71 They disproportionately think they
are better managers,72 more ethical, 73 more intelligent,74 and even less self-
serving75 than others. Eyewitnesses are chronically overconfident,7 6 as are stock
traders.77 More broadly, people also overestimate their own knowledge and
ability to make accurate judgMents. 78
university professors found that 94% thought they were better at their jobs than their average
colleague.
THOMAs Gn.ovIcH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T SO: THE FALLBiLrry OF REASON IN
EVERYDAY LIFE 77-78 (1991).
69 In a recent highly-publicized study, Kruger and Dunning demonstrated that
incompetent people suffer the "dual burden" of not only being bad at a task, but being unable to
judge their own competence. Thus, in four studies, they found that people averaging
performance in the 12th percentile judged themselves as performing in the 62nd percentile.
Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware oflt: How Difculties in Recognizing
One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1121,1121 (1999).
7 0 See Ola Svensen, Are We All Less Risky and More Silful than Our Fellow Drivers?,
47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 143 (1981).
71 See Caroline E. Preston & Stanley Harris, Psychology of Drivers in Traffic Accidents,
49 J. APPLiED PSYCHOL. 284,286 (1965).
72 Laurie Larwood & William Whittaker, Managerial Miopia: Self-Serving Biases in
Organizational Planning, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 194, 198 (1977) (noting that "[s]tudies
indicate that self-serving biases are a wide-ranging phenomenon that can affect managerial
decision-making through the process of overly optimistic planning!).
73 See RAYMOND C. BAUMHART, AN HONESTPROFIT20-22 (1968).
74 David Dunning et a]., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait
Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments ofAbility, 57 J. PERSONALrIY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1082,
1088 (1989) [hereinafter Dunning et a]., Ambiguity] (finding evidence of the "above average'
effect, which comes from most people responding that they are above average in most tasks).
75 jaes Friedrich, On Seeing Oneself as Less Self-Serving than Others: The Ultinate
Self-Serving Bias? 23 TEACHIG OF PSYCHOL. 107, 108 (April 1996) (finding that "students
who had been informed of the research on self-serving biases in judgment nevertheless saw
themselves as engaging in such distortions less often than the average person").
76 See John S. Shaw III & Kimberly A. McClure, Repeated Postevent Questioning Can
Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 629, 650 (1996)
(finding that overconfidence, but not accuracy, rose with repeated questioning of subjects in
study).
77 See Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 120 (referencing Terrance Odean,
Volume, Volatility, Price and Profit whe,'. All Traders Are above Average (1996) (unpublished
paper explaining excessive trading in foreign exchange markets and on the NYSE as a product
of overconfidence)); Werner F.M. De Bondt, A Portrait of the Individual Investor, 42 EUR.
ECON. REV. 831, 839-40 (1998) (reporting on results of a survey of investors showing
substantial overconfidence as well as overoptimism); David Hirshleifer et a]., Security Analysis
and Trading Patterns when Some Investors Receive Information before Others, 49 J. FIN. 1665,
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People also tend to be unduly optimistic. They exhibit overoptimism about
their futures, believing in large percentages that they are more likely than the
average person to succeed in their marriages, 79 their professional careers,80 and
their investment decisions. 81 They think that they are less likely to be victims of
lung cancer,82 AIDS,83 and drug addiction 84 than other people.85 They have
1686 (1994) (finding substantial hubris among investment professionals); Electronic
Commerce: New Online Traders Vulnerable to Overconfidence, UC Davis Scholars Find,
BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Sept. 14, 1999, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNASLD File (citing
Brad Barber & Terrance Odean, The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual
Investors (reporting a UC Davis Working Paper) (finding substantial evidence of
overconfidence and other cognitive biases in online stock trading)).
78 See Lyle A. Brenner et al., Overconfidence in Probability and Frequency Judgments: A
CriticalExamination, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 212,218 (1996) (finding
overconfidence as well as poor use of base rate information and vulnerability to
representativeness heuristic); Hillel J. Einhom, Overconfidence in Judgment, 4 NEW
DIRECTIONs FOR METHODOLOGY OF SOc. AND BEHAV. SaC. 1, 14 (1980) (quoting Will Rogers:
"It's not what we don't know that gives us trouble. It's what we know that ain't so.").
79 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is above
Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 439,443 (1993) (finding that people estimate that half of married couples will divorce
but place their own chance at zero).
80 See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALrIY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 806, 809-14 (1980) (finding, for example, that there were six
times as many college students who believed that they were more likely than the average person
to own their own home than those who believed that they were less likely).
81 See HERSH SHEFRiN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR 131-32 (2000) (reporting studies
showing overoptimism as well as overconfidence by investors).
82 Linda S. Perloff & Barbara K. Fetzer, Self-Other Judgments and Perceived
Vulnerability to Victimization, 50 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 502, 508-09 (1986)
(finding both cognitive and motivational factors accounting for people perceiving themselves as
"unique[ly] invulnerab[le]" to victimization).
83 Jill G. Joseph et al., Perceived Risk of AIDS: Assessing the Behavioral and
Psychosocial Consequences in a Cohort of Gay Men, 17 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 231, 234-
35 (1987) (finding in a cohort of 637 gay men that "very few men believed that either their
absolute or comparative risk of AIDS was great" even though 40% of the cohort was already
demonstrating HIV antibodies).
84 Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems:
Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED. 481, 493-497 (1987)
(finding unrealistic optimism regarding drug addiction and a variety of potential health
problems among the populations as a whole, and finding that the bias is "largely unrelated to
age, sex, level of education, or occupational prestige").
85 See also GILOVICH, supra note 68, at 77-78 (surveying several studies and noting that
"people tend to think that they are more likely than their peers to experience a variety of
favorable events like owning a home or eaming a large salary, but less likely to experience
aversive [sic] events like getting divorced or suffering from lung cancer. Recent public opinion
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unrealistic expectations regarding the election prospects of the candidates they
favor86 and the prospects of their favorite football team to win a game, even when
it is trailing at halftime.87
The overconfidence bias88 and the related phenomenon of overoptimism 89
are extremely robust, helping to explain phenomena from excessive litigation90 to
the large premiums acquiring companies pay in corporate takeovers. 91 In general,
the self-serving bias has also proved to be hardy in most of its manifestations,
including excessive litigation 92 and large takeover premiums, even among
accountants. 93
polls indicate that although only 25% of the population believes that the country as a whole will
be better off financially in the coming year, 54% nevertheless think that they will do better.").
86 Babad, Wishful Thinking, supra note 23, at 105 (finding "[s]trong" wishful thinking by
voters in the 1993 mayoral election in Jerusalem and noting several other studies finding this
effect).
87 See id
88 See Dunning et al., Ambiguity, supra note 74, at 1088 (finding evidence that self-
serving evaluations arise partly from people's idiosyncratic definitions of the traits they are
asked to assess); E. Scott Geller & Gordon F. Pitz, Confidence and Decision Speed in the
Revision of Opinion, 3 ORG. BEHAv. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 190, 199 (1968) (finding
confidence often grew even following disconfirming events); Gerd Gigerenzer et al.,
Probabilistic Mental Models: A Brunswikian Theory of Confidence, in RESEARCH ON
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 95, 96 (William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth eds.,
1997) (noting near total failure of debiasing attempts).
89 See BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT, supra note 38, at 95 ("[P]eople have been found to
perceive themselves as being better than others across a number of traits, including honesty,
cooperativeness, rationality, driving skill, health, and intelligence."); Babad, Wishful Thinking,
supra note 23, at 105 ("[']he undeniable conclusion [of seven large-scale studies] is that the
self-serving bias of vishfully distorted predictions of game or election outcomes is intense, and
largely resistant to change."); Kevin M. Taylor & James A. Shepperd, Bracing for the Worst:
Severity, Testing, and Feedback Timing as Moderators of the Optimistic Bias, 24 PERsONALrrY
& Soc. PsYCHOL. BULL. 915, 915 (1998) (noting that studies have "shown the optimistic bias
to be quite robust [and wide-ranging]').
90 See Don L. Coursey & Linda R Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior within the
Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 161, 175
(1988) (showing that "as much of the law and economics literature suggests ... litigating
parties are overly optimistic about their chances at trial" and therefore unwilling to settle for a
reasonable amount).
9 1 See Mathew LA. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paidfor
Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103, 120 (1997) ("Our results
suggest that CEO hubris, manifested as exaggerated pride or self-confidence, plays a substantial
role in the acquisition process, particularly in the decision of how much to pay.").
92 Regarding one of its manifestations, the biased view of a fair settlement amount and the
overoptimism regarding what a judge or jury will actually award, Babock and her colleagues
have had mixed results attempting to debias the self-serving bias. See Babcock & Loewenstein,
supra note 1, at 115 (having no luck debiasing subjects by explaining the self-serving bias to
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3. Interplay of Cognitive and Motivational Factors
So, facets of the self-serving bias, such as the fairness bias or the self-
attribution bias, may be either cognitively-based or motivationally-based, or a
combination of the two.94 Causation is unclear.95 Perhaps cognitive biases cause
people to access only information dealing with themselves and to fail to access
less vivid information about others, creating a self-serving effect. Or perhaps a
self-serving motivation causes people's memories to access only information that
supports their goals, beliefs, and attributions. In either event the result is the
same-a strong self-serving bias that affects people's attitudes, beliefs, inferential
strategies, attributions of causation, fairness judgments, and the like. Many
them or by having them write an essay arguing the opponent's case as convincingly as possible,
but having modest success by asking them to list the weaknesses of their own case); Linda
Babcock et al., Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 913,
922-23 (1997) (having success by forcing study subjects to list the weaknesses in their own
case). See also Frank P. McKenna & Lynn B. Myers, lllusory Self-Assessments--Can They Be
Reduced?, 88 BRrr. J. PSYCHOL. 39, 47-48 (1997) (finding strong overconfidence effects
among student drivers, but reporting some luck in reducing those effects using accountability).
9 3 Numerous studies show that accountants are subject to the overconfidence bias. See,
e.g., Jeffrey R. Cohen, An Exploratory Examination of International Differences in Auditors'
Ethical Perceptions, 7 BEHAV. RES. IN Accr. 37, 58 (1995) [hereinafter Cohen, Exploratory
Examination] (showing that most auditors believe they will act more ethically than their peers);
Pamela Kent & Ron Weber, Auditor Expertise and the Estimation ofDollar Error in Accounts,
34 ABACUS 120, 137 (1998) (finding considerable overconfidence by auditors in their ability
to make accurate judgments about dollar errors that might exist in accounts because of internal
control weaknesses); Thomas Kida, An Investigation into Auditors' Continuity and Related
Qualification Judgments, 18 J. AcCr. RES. 506, 519 (1980) (finding no correlation between
auditors' confidence in their ability to make going-concem judgments and their accuracy in so
doing); Lawrence A. Ponemon, The Objectivity ofAccountants'Litigation Support Judgments,
70 Acer. REV. 467, 484 (1995) (finding that 83% of auditors believe that they have above-
average skill in estimating missing inventory); Wilfred C. Uecker, The Effects of Knowledge of
the User's Decision Model in Simplified Information Evaluation, 18 J. ACer. RES. 191, 205
(1980) (finding that as auditors practiced estimating optimal sample sizes, their confidence
grew, but not their accuracy).
94 See Babad, Wishful Thinking, supra note 23, at 107 (noting that "[ilt would seem
reasonable to view wishful thinking [overoptimism] as a motivational construct that influences
cognitive processing"); Messick & Sentis, Fairness Biases, supra note 31, at 70.
95 It has been noted that:
There is much disagreement in psychology about the origin of self-serving biases. Some
argue that the biases are caused by the motivation to feel better about oneself Others argue that
self-serving biases are simply an artifact of cognitive processes and serve no motivational or
adaptive purpose.
George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments ofFairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J.
LEGAL STUD. 135, 141 (1993).
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sophisticated studies indicate a role for both cognitive and motivational views.96
It is quite possible that "[p]eople rely on cognitive processes and representations
to arrive at their desired conclusions, but [that] motivation plays a role in
determining which of these will be used on a given occasion." 97
Consider the confirmation bias: the tendency of people to search for and
credit information that supports their pre-existing beliefs more than information
that contradicts themP8 Although the confirmation bias clearly has cognitive
aspects, it is a self-serving motivation to be right and consistent that frames the
question, shaping the impact of the confirmation bias. Supporters of 1960
Presidential candidate Richard Nixon were motivated to evaluate the evidence in
such a way as to support the proposition that Nixon won the debate with
Kennedy. Kennedy's supporters were motivated to evaluate the evidence in such
a way as to support the proposition that Kennedy won the debate. Both groups
had the same cognitive limitations, but their motives tended to lead them to polar
opposite, self-serving conclusions.
Consider the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance: the tendency of people to
reduce or avoid psychological inconsistencies.99 People are motivated to think of
themselves as accurate, consistent decision-makers. Having communicated to the
superior the conclusion that he was the most worthwhile member of his team, the
hypothetical employee in the earlier scenario will have a strong motivation to
96 See Amber L. Story & David Dunning, The More Rational Side of Self-Serving
Protoypes: The Effects of Success and Failure Performance Feedback; 34 J. EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PSYCHOL. 513, 525-28 (1998). The subjects studied, who succeeded in an experiment
testing their ability as clinical psychologists, tended to infer both that skills and characteristics
they previously believed they possessed were important to the task and that they must possess
the skills and characteristics that they had previously believed to be important to the task.
Although many studies had indicated a motivational basis for such conclusions, Story and
Dunning concluded that perhaps they were just learning from experience.
97 Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480,480 (1990)
(citing other sources).
98 The confirmation bias is to some extent a tendency of people to see what they expect to
see. When testing a hypothesis, individuals tend to preferentially solicit evidence that confirms
their hypothesis and to downplay or ignore evidence that undermines it. See Jerome S. Bruner
& Leo J. Postman, On the Perception ofIncongruity: A Paradigm, 18 J. PERSONALITY 206, 222
(1949) (finding that "perceptual organization is powerfully determined by expectations built
upon past commerce wvith the environment'); Michael E. Doherty et al., Pseudodiagnosticity,
43 ACrA PSYCHOLOGICA 111, 118 (1979) (finding that people are unskilled in detecting
potentially disconfirming information); Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation,
Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211, 225 (1987)
(arguing that the confirmation bias is better understood as a "positive test strategy" which
generally serves well as a broad heuristic, although it can lead to systematic errors or
inefficiencies); PLOUS, supra note 22, at 232-34 (noting several studies confirming the
confirmation bias); Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. Lrr. 11,26(1998)
("People tend to misread evidence as additional support for initial hypotheses.").
99 See generally LEON FESrNGER, A THEORY OF COGNmvE DIssONANcE (1957).
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cognitively recognize only, or at least give substantially more weight to, evidence
that supports that conclusion. Contradictory evidence is often largely suppressed
by cognitive processes, 00 but self-serving motivational factors play a key role.
Additionally, consider the related notion of belief perseverance. Several
studies show that information that is inconsistent with previously held beliefs is
processed neither fully nor accurately and is often discounted significantly.' 01
Previously-held beliefs often persevere in the face of evidence that completely
discredits them.102 Again, although cognitive phenomena are clearly at work,
motivational forces cannot be ignored because many have argued that
"individuals engage in belief-maintaining reasoning because it produces a variety
of positive short-term outcomes, such as enhanced self-esteem, self-righteous
feelings, a heightened sense of control, and an optimistic view of the self."103
100 Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers'
Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 102-03 (1993) [hereinafter
Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?] ("When people voluntarily commit themselves to a
certain position, attitude or belief, the subsequent discovery of information that indicates
harmful consequences flowing from that commitment directly threatens their self-concept as
good, worthwhile individuals. Thus, cognitive processes will work to suppress such information
if at all possible.").
101 See, e.g., Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential
Decision Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 568, 569 (1992) (noting "the robust tendency of individuals to perceive information
that is consistent with a preferred judgment conclusion ... as more valid than information that
is inconsistent with that conclusion").
102 See Craig A. Anderson et al., Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of
Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information, 39 3. PERSONALrIY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 1037, 1045 (1980) (finding that people will persevere in beliefs even after a strong
discrediting of the evidence upon which the beliefs were formed); Charles G. Lord et al., Biased
Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently
Considered Evidence, 37 3. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 2098, 2108 (1979) [hereinafter
Lord et al., Biased Assimilation] (noting "a number of studies showing that once formed,
impressions about the self, beliefs about other people, or theories about functional relationships
between variables can survive the total discrediting of the evidence that first gave rise to such
beliefs"); Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the
Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 53, at 129, 144 ("It appears that beliefs-from relatively narrow
personal impressions to broader social theories-are remarkably resilient in the face of
empirical challenges that seem logically devastating.").
103 Paul A. Klaczynski & David H. Gordon, Self-Serving Influences on Adolescents'
Evaluation of Belief-Relevant Evidence, 62 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 317, 318
(1996). See also Mark Schaller, In-Group Favoritism and Statistical Reasoning in Social
Inference: Implications for Formation and Maintenance of Group Stereotypes, 63
J. PERSONALrTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 61, 71 (1992) (finding that group members selectively
engage in statistical inference strategies as a means ofjustifying in-group favoritism and that the
motivation affects inferential reasoning even if facts are remembered accurately).
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The impact of motivational forces is not unlimited. The literature in
motivational reasoning provides substantial evidence that people reach the
conclusions they desire to reach for self-serving reasons, but that this effect is
constrained "by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications.' 10 4
In other words, people are generally unable to reach self-serving conclusions in
the absence of any evidence to support that view. An auditor who wished for self-
serving reasons to please a client who was undoubtedly and drastically insolvent
would be unlikely to issue a clean opinion. As Professor Kunda notes, "when one
wants to draw a particular conclusion, one feels obligated to construct a
justification for that conclusion that would be plausible to a dispassionate
observer." 10 5 However, under ambiguity, people are motivated and able to reach
conclusions that can plausibly be supported by the available ambiguous evidence.
In other words, with a few ambiguous facts on which to hang her hat, a self-
interested auditor may be able to certif financial statements that are wildly
inaccurate. To put a slightly broader gloss on the matter, many studies of
motivated reasoning demonstrate the "tendency for individuals to utilize a variety
of cognitive mechanisms to arrive, through a process of apparently unbiased
reasoning, at the conclusion they privately desired to arrive at all along."'1 6 In this
regard, the human capacity for rationalization is potent.' 07
I. ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE SELF-SERVING BIAS
The same factors that induce a person to believe that he is the most deserving
candidate for a raise and tend to induce auditors to conclude that their lucrative
clients are entitled to the clean audit opinion they desire, also affect other
economic actors. Although the law asks much of auditors when it demands that
they be purer than Caesar's wife when doing attest-related work, other
professionals are also asked to be objective, if not independent. The evidence
indicates that these other professionals, such as attorneys, physicians, and
104 Kunda, supra note 97, at 480; Rasyid Sanitioso et al., Motivated Recruitment of
Autobiographical Memories, 59 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 229, 238-40 (1990)
(finding that when subjects were led to believe that a given trait was desirable, their
autobiographical memories reflecting that trait became more accessible to them and concluding
that motivation affects the recruitment of autobiographical memories).
105 Kunda, supra note 97, at 493.
106 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problems
ofMarket Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630,653 (1999).
107 See Loewenstein, Skewed Trade-Off, supra note 22, at 222 (citing a 1994 study by
Chris Hsee, finding that when faced with two job candidates, one of whom is more competent
and the other more attractive, people tend to hire the more competent person only when the
information they are given is extremely clear that the less attractive candidate is more
competent).
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investment bankers, often fail miserably in their attempts to be objective, largely
because of the self-serving bias and related effects.
A. Attorneys
Although their highest duty is to the integrity of the legal system,1 08
attorneys, when representing clients in court, are asked to be zealous advocates
for their client's cause.10 9 In this setting, attorneys are not asked to be objective in
their presentation of the facts. 110 Nonetheless, the attorney's professional code
requires, even in the advocate's role, "that the professional exercise his or her best
judgment in advising the client and not parrot that which the client would like if
the professional did not believe that this was correct advice, or even the best
advice."I 11 And certainly in other contexts, such as where corporate attorneys
serve as trusted advisers, the clients need (and at some level want) objectivity and
what Langevoort calls "cognitive independence. '112
Many corporate legal clients have a bundle of organizational quirks of the
type that can lead to serious mistakes in planning, ethics, and legal compliance. 113
Yet, Langevoort has argued persuasively that it is extremely difficult for attorneys
to overcome their own cognitive biases and other limits on rational thought in
order to give the objective and independent advice that is so needed.114
Langevoort and Rasmussen have predicted, based on economic reasoning with a
large infusion of behavioral research, that attorneys will act self-interestedly in a
number of ways, including the giving of overly pessimistic advice to corporate
clients regarding litigation risk in order to increase their importance to, and fees
paid by, the client.115 Edelman, Abraham, and Erlanger's detailed study of legal
108 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 53 (1983).
109 Id., atR. 13 crnt. (1983).
110 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBLrrY EC 7-15 (1980) ("A lawyer appearing
before an administrative agency, regardless of the nature of the proceeding it is conducting, has
the continuing duty to advance the cause of the client within the bounds of the law.").
111 See MDP REPORT, supra note 5, at 15-16.
112 Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs,
Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 634 (1997) [hereinafter
Langevoort, Epistemology].
113 See Robert Gibbons, Taking Coase Seriously, 44 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 145, 146 (1999)
(noting that "[r]ecent models of internal organization predict that organizations will be a mess
but not a mystery").
114 Langevoort, Epistemology, supra note 112, at 647-56.
1 15 Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 63, at 437-38.
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advice given in the wrongful discharge field seems to provide a vivid empirical
illustration ofjust this result of the self-serving bias.1 16
B. Physicians
Ideally, physicians would exercise objective and independent judgment in
their diagnoses and prescriptions for treatment of patients, but the ideal seems
often to go unrealized, in part because physicians are also victims of the self-
serving bias.117 For example, before Congress put a stop to the practice via the
Stark law (which many physicians are currently trying to have repealed), 1 8
physicians routinely referred patients for tests to facilities in which they owned an
economic interest.1 19 Numerous studies documented that physicians would order
more tests and longer treatments when they referred patients (particularly well-
insured patients) to facilities that they owned than when they referred patients to
facilities owned by others.120 The results of the studies were dramatically
116 Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of
Wrongul Discharge, 26 L. & Soc'Y REV. 47, 73-77 (1992) (finding that both attorneys and
personnel professionals appear to exaggerate the threat of wrongful discharge liability in order
to increase their importance to the client and, in the case of attorneys, their revenue stemming
from the client). In other contexts, attorneys can be overly optiristic in the advice they give to
clients. Elizabeth F. Lofius & Willem A. Wagenaar, Lawyers' Predictions of Success, 28
JURIMETRICS J. 437, 450-51 (1988) (finding that attorneys, while not very accurate at judging
the outcome of litigation, tend toward overoptimism).
117 Eric H. Marcus, Unbiased Medical Testimony: Reality or Myth?, 6 AM. J. FORENsIc
PsYcHIATRY 3, 4 (#4) (1985) (noting that if a diagnosing doctor is also the doctor who will
render-and charge for-treatment, he or she often has "a bias in favor of finding something
wrong to treaf').
11 8 Kristen Hallam, Providers Unite on Repeal of Compensation Ban, MOD.
HEALTHCARF, Aug. 2, 1999, at 12 (noting that physicians support dilution of the Stark law).
119 Jean M. Mitchell & Elton Scott, New Evidence of the Prevalence and Scope of
Physician Joint Ventures, 268 JAMA 80, 83 (1992) (finding a surprisingly high amount of
physician financial involvement in health care businesses outside their own practice).
120 Thomas L. Carson, Conflicts of Interest, 13 J. Bus. ETICS 387, 394 (1994) ("[W]hen
physicians are paid according to how much work they do for their patients, many physicians
succumb to the temptation to provide their patients with unnecessary, even dangerous
treatments.'). See Thomas S. Crane, The Problem of Physician Self-Referral under the
Medicare and Medicaid Antikickback Statute, 268 JAMA 85, 86 (1992) (citing studies by the
Office of the Inspector General and the State of Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board
showing how physicians respond to financial incentives in their treatment practices); David
Hemenway et al., Physicians'Response to Financial Incentives, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1059,
1061 (1990) (finding that when compensation of physicians changed from a flat fee to a bonus
system where they could earn extra revenue by ordering laboratory tests for patients on
machines owned by employers, physicians increased their orders for lab tests by 23%); Bruce J.
Hillman et al., Frequency and Costs of Diagnostic Imaging in Office Practice-A Comparison
of Self-Referring and Radiologist-Referring Physicians, 323 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1604, 1606
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inconsistent with the Hippocratic oath, but well aligned with the physicians'
economic self-interest. The American Medical Association (AMA) reacted to this
conflict of interest, much as the accounting profession often does, by declaring
such self-referrals to be unethical only after Congress outlawed them.121
C. Investment Bankers and Securities Analysts
Investors would make more efficient decisions if investment bankers and
securities analysts rendering opinions could do so objectively, but this does not
seem to be the case. Investment bankers are often hired to render fairness opinions
in major corporate transactions, but the fairness of the opinions is often extremely
questionable. Investment bankers have some conflicts of interest that resemble
those of auditors, and others that are much worse. A management is not trying
very hard if it cannot find an investment bank that will express the opinion that
management wants expressed. At least three factors create unreliable, self-serving
opinions by investment bankers, and two of those apply to auditors:
(1990) (finding that self-referring physicians employed diagnostic imaging at least four times as
frequently than their colleagues who referred patients to others); Bruce J. Hillman et al.,
Physicians' Utilization and Charges for Outpatient Diagnostic Imaging in a Medicare
Population, 268 JAMA 2050, 2050 (1992) (finding self-referral resulting in 1.7 to 7.7 times
more frequent performing of imaging examinations than radiologist-referral); Jean M. Mitchell
& Elton Scott, Physician Ownership of Physical Therapy Services, 268 JAMA 2055, 2055
(1992) (finding that visits per patient were 39% to 45% higher in facilities where referring
physicians were joint venturers and that more revenues were generated from patients with well-
paying insurance). See also George J. Annas & Frances H. Miller, The Empire of Death: How
Culture and Economies Affect Informed Consent in the U.S., the UK, and Japan, 20 AM. J. L.
& MED. 357, 383 (1994) ('The medical literature also documents persuasively that when
physicians receive additional income from their diagnostic methods or their treatment
recommendations, utilization increases dramatically."); Julie E. Mathews, The Physician Self-
Referral Dilemma: Enforcing Antitrust Law as a Solution, 19 AM. J. L. & MED. 523, 525
(1993) (citing evidence that financial incentives motivate self-referring physicians to
recommend tests or treatment for patients even when patients do not need them and to refer
patients only to facilities where they have an economic stake whether or not they provide the
best care).121 Mark Taylor, Healthcare Struggles with Stark Reality, MOD. HEALTHCARB, July 5,
1999, at 30. Congress outlawed such self referrals via the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of
1989 ("Stark r'), 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1989) (amended in 1993 by Stark 11), later amended and
expanded by "Stark I" that banned additional potential conflicts. Stark 11, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn
(1993). The AMA did not act until 1991 and 1992. Prepared Testimony of Kathy Buto, Deputy
Director, HCFA Center for Health Plans & Providers Before the House Ways & Means
Committee Health Subcommittee, FED. NEWS SERv., at LEXIS, Academic Universe,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe (May 13, 1999); Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary
Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21
AM. J. L. & MED. 241,250 (1995).
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There are several reasons why fairness opinions may be extremely unreliable when
provided by target management's own bankers. First, the fees for such opinions are
large and a management which is not given the type of opinion it wants may shop
elsewhere. Second, losing the corporation as a client for the fairness opinion may also
mean losing all sorts of other business that the investment banker has been or would
like to be providing to that client Third, and most problematic, investment bankers
frequently work on contingency fees where their compensation increases dramatically
if a hostile offer is defeated and a management-sponsored alternative which they have
prepared succeeds. The conflict of interest in such situations is glaring and,
apparently, nearly irresistible. 122
Not surprisingly, knowledgeable observers have deemed fairness opinions
"made-to-order recommendations ... that support managers' pre-established
positions,"'12 3 "virtually worthless,"'124 and a "deceit upon the investing public
and the marketplace generally."'1 25 Several courts have also noted the general
unreliability of these self-serving opinions.' 2 6
Securities analysts purport to provide objective analyses and
recommendations to investors, of course. Yet they face similar pressures, and it
has been stated that analysts "are under exquisite pressure to hear and see no
'evil,' to write only upbeat reports about the companies which they too see as the
122 Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and the "Nancy
Reagan Defense". May Target Boards "Just Say No "? Should They be Allowed to?, 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 377,468-69 (1990).
123 Dale Arthur Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or
Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207, 211 (1988).
124 Richard B. Schmitt, Suspect Opinions: f an Investment Bank Says the Deal Is Fair, It
May or May Not Be, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1988, at I (quoting securities attorney Harvey
Kronfeld).
125 Benjamin J. Stein, Investment Banking's Dirty Little Secret, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1986,
§ 3, at 2. See also Paul Sweeney, Who Says It's a Fair Deal?, J. Accr., Aug. 1999, at 44, 47
("Academics and legal experts tend to agree that a fairness opinion from a company's merger
adviser has little value to investors.").
126 See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F2d 250, 257 (7th Cir.
1986), reviewed on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (noting that Smith Barney would have
lost a $75,000 bonus had it advised the board that the tender offer was fair and deeming it
"mystifying" that Smith Barney could render a fairness opinion on a tender offer before it knew
the offer price); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264,275 (2d Cir.
1986) (shallow, conclusory opinion of investment banker held not to support target board's
decision to grant lock-up option to white knight); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco,
Inc., 551 Al2d 787, 792 (Del. Ch. 1988) (regarding a contingent-fee based fairness opinion
stating a $74-$87 "reference range" and noting that "[t]he so-called reference ranges do not
purport to be a range of fair value; but just what they purport to be is (deliberately, one
imagines) rather unclear").
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source of business far more profitable than the trading commissions that are the
immediate raison d'etre of those reports. 1 2
7
Hayward and Boeker recently performed an extensive empirical study of
security analysts' ratings of corporate equity securities.128 They sought to
determine, if the investment banking side of a securities firm was hired by a client
to assist in a merger or some similar transaction, would the financial analysts on
the other side of the firm tend to assign a higher rating to the client's securities
than other analysts? Their study found such an effect, and concluded that it was a
"dominant, entrenched outcome." 129 They also found that the larger the client, the
greater the effect.130 Although Hayward and Boeker ascribe much of this effect to
the balance of power within investment banking firms, clearly firm self-interest
helps account for the fact that analysts' "buy" recommendations outnumber "sell"
recommendations by a ratio of 87 to 1.131
127 Lowenstein, Paparazzi, supra note 9, at 52 (citing Gretchen Morgenson, See No Evil,
Speak No Evil, FORBES, Dec. 15, 1997, at 162). See also Debbie Galant, The Hazards of
Negative Research Reports, INSTrTMifONAL INVESTOR, July 1990, at 73 (reporting results of a
survey in which 61% of surveyed analysts reported that they had been pressured by employers
into tempering negative reports and giving example of when Donald Trump successfully
intimidated a client into firing an analyst with whom he was unhappy); Mark Hulbert,
Compromised Analysts? The SEC Is Shocked, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1999, at A14 ("Savvy
investors always have been aware that Wall Street analysts operate under serious conflicts of
interest and compromised objectivity.'; Robert McGough, Bearish Call on Banks Lands
Analyst in Doghouse, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1999, at CI (giving example of the grief an
objective analyst may suffer and noting "[i]t is no longer news that analysts' recommendations
may lack objectivity"); Gretchen Morgenson, Flying Blind in a Fog ofData, N.Y. TIMES, June
18, 2000, § 3, at I (reporting on study by Georgia State University Professor Siva Nathan
finding that analysts writing about companies whose securities were underwritten by the
analysts' firms issued 25% more "buy" recommendations and 46% fewer "sell"
recommendations than other analysts); Suzanne Woolley & Linda Himelstein, f You Can't Say
Something Nice About a Company... Analysts Are Under Growing Pressure to Stifle Negative
Reports, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1996, at 119 ("The pressure [for analysts] to avoid issuing
unfavorable reports is intensifying as investment banking comes to account for a greater portion
of many firms' revenues.").
An interesting example of the lack of objectivity, coming from a different perspective, was
Piper Jaffray's Ashok Kumar who praised eMachines while lobbying its CEO for underwriting
work on its IPO. When eMachines did not allocate any of the IPO to Kumar's firm, his analysis
of eMachines shifted 180 degrees as he went from lavish praise to calling it "sucker.com' Peter
Burrows, A Sudden Change ofHeart at Piper, Bus. WK., Dec. 6, 1999, at 6.
12 8 Hayward & Boeker, supra note 19.
129 Id. at 14.
13 0 Id. at 15.
131 James B. Kelleher, Can You Trust Analysts?, WICHITA EAGLE, Jan. 3, 2000, at llA
(noting a study by First Call research firm).
The occasional libel suit filed by companies given unflattering reviews by analysts could
provide an additional self-serving reason to favor "buy" recommendations. Elizabeth
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Like accountants, financial analysts have a code of ethics,132 but Hayward
and Boeker concluded that "[t]he props of self-governance, namely, codes of
ethics and Chinese walls, may foster impressions that analysts' professional
standards are being met. But these devices merely mask actual, backstage
behavior, and the malleable, porous, and increasingly transparent nature of
Chinese walls suggests that they actually resemble 'the emperor's clothes."' 133
D. Expert Witnesses
Expert witnesses should be objective,134 but they are affected by the same
cognitive biases and limitations on rationality that affect everyone else, 135 so it is
not surprising that they are affected by the self-serving bias as well. For more than
a century, their bias has been widely noted.136 Long ago, Professor Himes
observed:
MacDonald, Libel Suits Pose a Risk for Analysts, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1999, at Cl ('Wall
Street analysts who dare to take the unusual step of criticizing companies in their research
reports routinely risk being pilloried by their institutional-investor clients, frozen out of
company conference calls or even fired... [and now] they have another problem to contend
with: libel suits.).
132 Securities analysts have a code of ethics. See generally ASSOCIATION FOR INVESTMENT
MANAGE Err AND RESEARCH (AIMR) CODE OF ETmICS AND STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr (May 1999), available at http://wwv.aimr.comlethics/codefullcode.html (on file
with The Ohio State Law Journal).
133 Hayward & Boeker, supra note 19, at 20 (citations omitted).
134 State ex rel. Lichtor v. Clark, 845 S.W.2d 55, 62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding it is
appropriate for a court to conduct a hearing concerning the professional objectivity of an
examining physician).
135 Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist
Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J. L. & HEALTH 15, 33 (1993-94) ("Expert witnesses, like the rest of
us, succumb to the meretricious allure of simplifying cognitive devices in their thinldng").
136 See, e.g., Winans v. N.Y. & Erie R.. Co., 62 U.S. (21 How.) 88, 101 (1858)
("Experience has shown that opposite opinions of persons professing to be experts may be
obtained to any amount."); Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N.Y. 507, 514 (1884) (noting that expert
witnesses' views "cannot fail generally to be warped by a desire to promote the cause in which
they are enlisted").
Over the years, the judgments of many courts have not softened any on this issue. See, e.g.,
Butman v. Christy, 198 N.W. 314, 317 (Iowa 1924) (calling expert testimony "of the lowest
order"); Opp v. Pryor, 128 N.E. 580, 583 (ll. 1920) (noting that expert testimony is "the most
unsatisfactory part ofjudicial administration"); United States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11166, at *43 (ll. App. July 15, 1999) (noting that the government's and
defendant's expert opinions diverged so substantially as to suggest bias); Knowledge Based
Techs. Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Mach., Corp., No. 96 Civ. 9461 (JSR), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4602, at
* 1 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 8, 1998) ("Claims of bias and self-interest could fairly be levelled [sic]
at a great many experts whose testimony is routinely admitted in federal courts."); Rail
Intermodal Specialists, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 154 F.R.D. 218, 221 (Iowa Ct. An.
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It is often surprising to see with what facility and to what an extent [experts'] views
can be made to correspond with the wishes or the interests of the parties who call
them... .[T]heir judgment becomes so warped by regarding the subject in one point
of view that even when conscientiously disposed, they are incapable of expressing a
candid opinion.... They are selected on account of their ability to express a favorable
opinion, which, there is great reason to believe, is in many instances the result alone
of employment and the bias growing out of it.137
The cause of expert bias may in some cases be the witnesses' conscious
desire to please their employers in order to gain additional business by them or
other attorneys involved in similar cases. 13 8 Many people now rely on expert
witness fees for a substantial portion of their total income.139 But, the subtle
subconscious factors underlying the self-serving bias may also be at work.
140
Epstein worries that experts' association with the attorneys who hire them impairs
their objectivity and neutrality.14 1 Studies show that psychiatrists, psychologists,
and other mental health professionals tend to slant their analysis and testimony
toward the party who hired them, even in sensitive matters such as the insanity
1994) ("[I]t is no secret that almost all retained experts will carry the same bias as counsel or
they will not be retained."); Rosenblitt v. Rosenblitt, 107 A.D.2d 292, 299 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985) (noting that "it is hardly a secret that [the current expert witness system] contains the
seeds of venally induced distortion"); State Highway Comm'n v. Superbilt Mfg. Co., 281 P.2d
707, 713 (Or. 1955) (stating that expert testimony is viewed with some suspicion).
137 William L. Foster, Expert Testimony-Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies,
11 HARV. L. REv. 169, 170-71 (1897) (quoting Professor C. Himes, The Scientific Expert in
Forensic Procedure, 135 J. FRANKLIN INST. 409 (1893)). See also Michael H. Graham, Expert
Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of
Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45, 47 (noting that "practicing lawyers can locate
quickly and easily an expert witness to advocate nearly anything the lawyers desire" and that
"many expert witnesses will testify to almost anything the client desires").
138 Richard A. Epstein, A New Regimefor Expert Witnesses, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 757,759
(1992) [hereinafter Epstein, New Regime] (noting that an expert witness who "brings home the
bacon" in one case is more likely to command larger fees in succeeding cases).
139 Graham, supra note 137, at 44.
140 Professor Epstein notes:
The rule against contingent fees (and the power of cross-examination) may curtail the
obvious forms of blatant prejudice through which the jury is likely to see in any event
Nonetheless, there are a lot of cases that are close to the line, and the expert who labors with a
powerful financial inducement (indirect to be sure), and a close client identification is likely, just
likely, to shade his opinion in favor of his client's position. The point here has little to do with
plaintiffs or defendants. With human nature what it is, we can be confident that experts on both
sides of the line will be prey to this particular failing.
Epstein, New Regime, supra note 138, at 759.
141 Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Control Over Expert Testimony: Of Deference and
Education, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1156, 1163 (1993). See Epstein, New Regime, supra note 138, at
759.
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defense in criminal cases and child custody matters. 142 The bias has become so
blatant that many courts and commentators view experts not as objective
witnesses but as full-fledged members of the "adversarial team" of the party on
whose behalf they are testifying.143
E. Scientists
Even scientists, who are generally trained to be objective, suffer from the
self-serving bias. One recent study surveyed the various participants in a lively
controversy over a particular type of heart drug (calcium channel blockers),
showing clear evidence of the self-serving bias in that 96% of the drug's
defenders had financial ties to its makers, 60% of neutral authors had such ties,
and only 37% of critical authors had such ties.144 Other studies have
demonstrated that when scientists evaluate studies done by others, they have a
142 Paul S. Applebebaum, In the Wake of Ake: The Ethics of Expert Testimony in an
Advocate's World, 15 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 15, 21 (#1) (1987) (noting the
"frequency with which highly respected [psychiatric] experts arrive at conclusions favorable to
the side for which they are wortdng or to which they have been assigned"); Robert J. Howell,
Professional Standards of Practice in Child Custody Examinations, 8 PSYCHOTHERAPY IN
PRIVATE PRAC. 15, 17 (No. 2) (1990) (noting that the remedy for this problem is to be hired by
the judge to act as a friend of the court); Eric H. Marcus, Unbiased Medical Testimony: Reality
or Myth?, 6 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 3, 4 (#4) (1985) (commenting on the inevitable bias
that infects the judgments of medical expert witnesses); Randy K. Otto, Bias and Expert
Testimony of Mental Health Professionals in Adversarial Proceedings: A Preliminary
Investigation, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 267, 271 (1989) (reporting results from laboratory study
finding evidence in criminal case setting but not in civil case setting that mental health
professionals' testimony often varies according to the side by which they are retained).
14 3 Kathleen Waits, Opinion Work Product: A Critical Analysis of Current Law and a
New Analytical Framework; 73 ORE. L. REV. 385,443 (1994). Professor Waits' analysis of the
opinion work product issue notes that some courts and their supporters take this view and
therefore oppose discovery of communications between experts and the attorneys that hired
them. Id. at 445-47. See also Katherine A. Staton, Note, Discovery of Attorney Work Product
Reviewed by an Expert Witness, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 812, 828 (1985) (arguing that the current
legal system "has legitimized adversarial use of experts"). See also generally, e.g., Bogosian v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that opinion work product documents
shown by lawyer to expert witness during deposition preparation are not discoverable).
Professor Waits prefers the opposing view of Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139
F.R.D. 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), which, according to Professor Waits, "posits not only the
importance of expert testimony, but of the need to have that testimony actually be as
independent as itpwports to be." Waits, supra, at 443.
144 Henry Thomas Stelfox et al., Conflict of Interest in the Debate Over Calcium-channel
Antagonists, 338 NEvENG. J. MED. 101, 101 (1998).
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strong tendency to give better ratings to studies that agree with their pre-existing
beliefs than to studies that do not.145
F. Judges
More than any actor on the American scene, judges should be independent
and objective. When judges act to advance their own personal interests or
ideologies, it "threatens the values of self-determination, accountability and
representationalism that provide core notions of American political theory."'146
Empirical evidence is mounting, however, that whether on a conscious or
subconscious level, judges of all types are affected by the self-serving bias.147 As
145 E.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of
Evidence Quality, 56 ORG. BEHAV. & Hum. DECIsION PRocYssEs 28, 47 (1993) (finding in
both a laboratory experiment and a quasi-experimental survey of practicing scientists that
"[r]esearch reports that confirmed scientists' prior beliefs were judged to be of higher quality
than those that did not"); Michael J. Mahoney, Publication Prejudices: An Experimental Study
of Confirmnatory Bias in the Peer Review System, I COGNmvE THERAPY & REs. 161, 161-62
(1977) (finding that professional reviewers' judgments about experimental procedures and their
resulting publication recommendations varied dramatically, depending on whether the
reviewers' pre-existing beliefs agreed or disagreed with the results of the submitted articles).
Needless to say, lay people suffer from the same effect See Lord et al., Biased
Assimilation, supra note 102, at 2105 (finding that when opponents and proponents of the death
penalty are given two opposing studies they tend strongly to find the one that agrees with them
to be more persuasive and this ambiguous evidence actually increases the polarization of
opposing viewpoints).
146 Martin H. Redish, Taking a Stroll through Jurassic Park- Neutral Principles and the
Originalist-Minimalist Fallacy in Constitutional Interpretation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 165, 166
(1993).
147 See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.L 2155, 2175
(1998) (finding that D.C. Circuit Court panels controlled by Republican-appointed judges were
much more likely to defer to conservative administrative agency decisions than were panels
controlled by Democrat-appointed judges); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in
Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial
Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 303-07 (criticizing ideological
decision-making by the D.C. Circuit); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology,
and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1770-71 (1997) (finding ideological effects in D.C.
Circuit decision-making in environmental cases); Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race,
Gender, Work; and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII
Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1171 (1992) (finding Democrat-
appointed judges much more favorable to discrimination claims than Republican-appointed
judges); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH-, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDINAL
MODEL 72-73 (1993) (claiming that most Supreme Court decisions are determined not by the
law, but by the Justices' political preferences); Laura A. Smith, Justiciability and Judicial
Discretion: Standing at the Forefront of Judicial Abdication, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1548,
1613 (1993) (finding substantial evidence of serious ideological rifts affecting decision-making
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Tiller and Cross have noted there is now substantial "evidence that partisan
ideology often influences judicial case decisions on a variety of issues... [and]
that judges exercise these partisan preferences through judicial decision-making
instfruments.' ' 148
III. AUDITORS AND =hE SELF-SERVING BIAS
A. Overview
Although the self-serving bias is a broad and robust phenomenon that is
manifested in the conduct of attorneys, doctors, securities analysts, expert
witnesses, scientists, judges, and just about everyone else, auditors are trained and
expected to be objective and independent. Yet, accountants, like everyone else,
are (boundedly) rational maximizers of their expected utility. Leading accounting
historians have described "the accountant [as] an enthusiastic income maximizer,
who pursues self-interest at the expense of other groups, and welcomes the
enhanced social status conferred by society."'149
Accountants are very effective utility maximizers, as the profession is
generally quite profitable.150 Indeed, accountants generally seem to be relentless
in their pursuit of profit. In recent times they have moved from their traditional
three mainstays of accounting, audit, and tax into computer consulting, M&A
advising,151 personal financial advising, strategic planning, insurance sales,
WebTrust,' 52 ElderCare services,153 feasibility studies, financing (securing and
in the D.C. Circuit); David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of
Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1195
(1999) (finding that decisions about federal pre-emption in the environmental field are the result
of "actions of (partly) ideologically-motivated federal judges"); Donald R. Songer, The Circuit
Courts of Appeals, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRmCAL AssEssMENT 35, 42-43 (John B.
Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991) (quantifying ideological decision-making by federal
circuit courts).
148 Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American
Justice, 99 COLuM. L. REv. 215,224 (1999).
149 DEREK MATITIS ET AL., THE PRIESTHOOD OF INDUSTRY: THE RISE OF THE
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTANT IN BRrISH MANAGEMENT 7-8 (1998).
150 Id. at 8-10.
151 See Nikhil Deogun & Elizabeth MacDonald, Winning by the Numbers: Bean Counters
Now Figure Big in Merger-Advisory Gamn,, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10,2000, at Cl, C22 (noting that
KPMG International advised on more mergers globally in 1999 than Morgan Stanley, Golden
Sachs, or any other firm in the world).
15 2 See Richard J. Koreto, A WebTrust Experience, J. ACcr., Oct. 1998, at 99-102
(explaining how WebTrust, whereby CPA firms attest to the fact that online merchants conform
to certain best practices, can boost Internet commerce).
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structuring) services, family office services, legal services, and just about every
other profit center they have been able to conjure up.154 As the Big Eight have
become the Big Six and then the Big Five (and almost the Big Four),155 dwarfing
the largest American law firms, 156 the image of a shark constantly moving and
feeding increasingly comes to mind.157 Small wonder that economists sit around
modeling when it would be rational for auditors to accept bribes158 or to conspire
against their clients' shareholder/owners. 159
The economists' rational utility maximizing model tells too simple a tale,
however. Even if auditors were determined to be the most rational of rational
utility maximizers, various biases and other limitations on human rationality
would prevent it.160 Furthermore, factors other than the desire to maximize their
own utility certainly influence auditor behavior. For example, most auditors
would not take bribes every time they knew they would escape detection and
153 See Karen Duggan et al., Opportunity Knocks: CPA ElderCare Services, J. Accr.,
Dec. 1999, at 43 ("ElderCare is intended to assure family members that elderly relatives no
longer able to be totally independent are receiving the kind and type of care they need.").
154 Authors of a prominent hombook recently rewrote the first chapter to address the
expanding services being offered by accountants. DAN L. GOLDWASSER & M. ThoMAs
ARNOLD, ACCOUNTANS' LL ABILrY 1-1 to 1-39 (2000).
155 Ernst & Young and KPMG Peat Marwick announced merger plans to create the
world's largest accounting firm and to reduce the Big Five to the Big Four, but later canceled
the merger. Jim Kelly, Maxwell's Legacy: The Fate of Coopers & Lybrand Suggests New
Penalties Are Needed, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 4, 1999, at 11 (discussing failed merger).
156 Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Ethical Traps of.Accounting Firm Lawyers, NAT'L LJ., Oct.
19, 1998, at A27 (noting that the largest U.S. law firm has about 2,300 lawyers, whereas the Big
Five accounting firms have more than 10,000 partners).
157 One attorney has referred to "the eat-what-you-kill economics of the omnivorous
accounting firms." Written Comments of Lawrence J. Fox before the American Bar
Association's Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, at http.//-wvvw.abanet.org/cpr
/fox2.html (last visited Nov. 20,2000 ) (on file with The Ohio State Law Journal).
15 8 See Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, Collusive Auditors, 85 AM. ECON. Ass'N
PAPERS AND PROC. 442, 442 (1995) ("For instance, the manager has an incentive to bribe the
auditor.").
159 See Stanley Baiman et al., Optimal Contracts with a Utility-Maximizing Auditor, 25 J.
ACCr. RES. 217, 217 (1987) (using the utility-maximizing auditor in an economic model
attempting to analyze how hiring auditors improves the principal-agent relationship and how
the principal overcomes the moral hazard problem with the auditor).
160 See Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into
Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 N.W. U. L. REV. 133, 143-280 (2000) [hereinafter Prentice,
Irrational Auditor]. For example, the fact that auditors, like others, are irrationally optimistic,
irrationally honor sunk costs, and are subject to cognitive dissonance, can cause auditors to stick
with a dishonest client long after it has become economically unwise to do so. Id
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punishment. Auditors, like others, are often influenced by their ethical beliefs, 161
and personality type.162 Auditors, like other employees, are also influenced by
both the specific authority figures within their firms and the cultures of their
firmS. 16 3
Nonetheless, the studies discussed in this section provide strong evidence that
accountants are as self-serving as the rest of the populace, and it is not difficult to
see how conflicts of interest arise to jeopardize an auditor's objectivity. When the
results suggested by application of the proper standards do not match the results
that the client's management desires, "[a]n auditor may find himself in a situation
where he can benefit from violating professional standards or lose by refusing to
violate the standards. ' 164 Auditors frequently have "substantial economic
incentives to please their clients."1 65 The auditor's self-interest may be framed in
bold relief in this context because, as Lawler and Rhode have explained:
The financial pressure first must be satisfied or else the CPA, for want of revenues,
will no longer be able to operate. If the CPA doesn't have clients to audit, then he or
she is soon out of business. This means that although the CPA should be primarily
concerned with an independent appraisal of the control system and resulting financial
reports, the CPA has more than a casual interest in seeing that his or her clients are
financially successful. Ideally, the client should be a success and the CPA should be
161 See Judy S. L. Tsui & Ferdinand A. Gul, Auditors' Behaviour in an Audit Conflict
Situation: A Research Note on the Role of Locus of Control and Ethical Reasoning, 21 ACCr.,
ORGs. & Soc'Y 41, 47 (1996) (finding that both levels of ethical reasoning and personality type
affected auditor pliancy in response to client pressure for improper accounting treatment).
162 See Tim Kelley & Loren Margheim, The Impact of Time Budget Pressure,
Personality, and Leadeship Variables on Dysfunctional Auditor Behavior, AuDrmNG: J. OF
PRAC. & THEORY, Spring 1990, at 21, 23-24 (citing several studies tending to find that Type A
individuals are more productive auditors than Type B personalities, but that they make poorer
decisions when patience is needed in conducting a complex task); Tsui & Gul, supra note 161,
at 47 (finding that whether an auditor's personality had external control or internal control
affected responsiveness to client pressure for improper accounting treatment).
163 See Frances L. Ayres & Dipankar Ghosh, Research in Ethics and Economic Behavior
in Accounting, 18 J. Acr. & PUB. POL'Y 335, 337 (1999) (noting that "inherent ethical
behavior may be fostered in an organization (and in policy-making) through the careful
structuring of incentives, rewards and penalties" within the firm); Carolyn A. Windsor & Neal
M. Ashkanasy, Auditor Independence Decision Making: The Role of Organizational Culture
Perceptions, 8 BEHAV. RES. IN Acr. 80, 94 (Supp. 1996) [hereinafter Windsor & Ashkanasy,
Auditor Independence] (finding that organizational culture of an accounting firm has some
impact on auditor decision-maldng).
164 Arieh Goldman & Benzion Barlev, The Auditor-Finn Conflict of Interests: Its
Implications for Independence, 49 ACCT. REV. 707, 709 (1974).
165 Christine M. Haynes et al., The Relationship between Client Advocacy and Audit
Experience: An Exploratory Analysis, 17 AuDrriNG: J. OFPRAC. & THEORY, 1998, at 88, 90.
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independent However, these attributes may be in conflict, and this can create
pressure-laden problems for the CPA.16
6
Unfortunately, when such a conflict arises, many believe that the client's
bargaining power is far superior to the auditor's because of the auditor's
dependence upon clients for its livelihood.167 Managers are willing to switch and
as many as eight hundred do switch per year.168 There are documented cases of
opinion shopping,169 and "[d]espite SEC disclosure requirements, discharges
166 EDWARD E. LAWLER II & JOHN GRANT RHODE, INFORMATION AND CONTROL IN
ORGANIzATIoNs 116-17 (Lyman W. Porter ed., 1976). Nichols and Price made this same point:
In the conflict situation, the [client] firn does not highly value the rewards that a specific
auditor can mediate. The rewards an individual auditor offers are special skills in accurately
assessing the financial operations of the firm. The firm may not be interested in the most
competent audit or most accurate statement of its financial position and results of operations.
Instead, the firm may desire to secure statements that have a particular expected impact on third
parties. Since anyone with the appropriate credentials is able to perform this type of attest
function, the individual auditor's expertise or special skills in accounting or auditing may have
little significance to the firm. On the other hand, the auditor is likely to place a high valuation on
the rewards that the firm can mediate, such as present and potential fees from the audit and,
perhaps, other services. The auditor places a high valuation on these rewards because they are
consistent with the auditor's needs.
Donald R. Nichols & Kenneth H. Price, The Auditor-Firm Conflict: An Analysis Using
Concepts of Exchange Theory, 51 Accr. REV. 335,337 (1976).
167 See LAWLER & RHODE, supra note 166, at 118 (arguing that as long as managers select
and compensate auditors, there is strong pressure upon the auditors to violate professional
standards); Goldman & Barley, supra note 164, at 710 ("Auditors usually operate in a buyer's
market: clients can choose the auditor they prefer from a large group of professionals. The firm
(the paying client) selects the auditor, determines his employment conditions, and displaces him
at will."); Carolyn A. Windsor & Neal M. Ashkanasy, The Effect of Client Management
Bargaining Power, Moral Reasoning Development, and Belief in a Just World on Auditor
Independence, 20 ACCr., ORGS. & SOC'Y 701,703 (1995) [hereinafter Windsor & Ashkanasy,
The Effect] ('Client management has an inherent bargaining advantage because auditors depend
upon client fees for their livelihood."); J. Scott Whisenant & Srinivasan Sankaraguruswamy,
Evidence on the Auditor and Client Relationship: What Can Be Learned from Reasons
Reported by Managers for Changing Auditors? (Jan. 2000) (unpublished Working Paper on file
with author) ("Conventional wisdom suggests that auditors do not like to lose clients. Our data
support this argument since only 16 percent of auditor changes are initiated by auditors").
168 Robert R. Tucker & Ella Mae Matsumura, Going Concern Judgments: An Economic
Perspective, 10 BEHAv. REs. INACCr. 179, 181 (1998) (citing sources).
169 See, e.g., In re Broadview Fin Corp., Exch. Act Release No. 21,949 [Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Releases 1982-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,454, at 63,202 (Apr. 17, 1985); In re Stephen 0. Wade; Ralph H. Newton, Jr.; Clark C.
Burritt, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 21,095 [Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases
1982-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,432 at 63, 136 (June 25, 1984); In
re Frantz, Warrick, Strack & Assocs., 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 332, 332-33 (Mar. 7,
[Vol. 61:15971632
SECAND MDP
relating to disputes over accounting methods are common." 170 However, the most
serious result of this conflict-of-interest is probably not out-and-out auditor
swapping by clients, but the tendency of auditors to grant inappropriate trealment
to clients in order to retain them.171 This pressure can lead even the most honest
and determined auditor to stray from the path of objectivity. One survey indicates
that 64% of security analysts (and 48% of regulators, 43% of accounting
professors, and 49% of portfolio managers) believe that the audit profession gives
in too easily to client pressure to "bend the rules." 172 Bazerman gives the famous
Phar-Mor scandal as an example of audit failure prompted by such self-serving
motives. 173
These are matters of grave concern, even though auditing in America is
generally good and likely the best in the world.174 While the American Institute
1986) (showing that a Maryland-based accounting firm settled charges of improperly issuing an
unqualified opinion to a client who wrongly claimed a $1.8 million gain from a transaction).
170 Reid Anthony Muoio, An Independent Auditor's Suit for Wrongful Discharge, 58
ALB. L. REV. 413, 427 (1994) (citing several sources). See also Harvey Hendrickson & Reza
Espahbodi, Second Opinion, Opinion Shopping and Independence, CPA J., Mar. 1991, at 26-
27 ("It seems clear that companies do indeed shop for opinions ... [and] the extent of the
practice may be underestimated because public disclosures [even under new SEC rules]
probably do not reveal the underlying reasons for changing auditors."); Sharon LaFraniere,
Behind S&Ls, Lax Audits: Losses Vanished After 'Opinion Shopping,' WASH. POST, Oct. 24,
1990, at AI, A7 (giving some apparently egregious examples in the savings & loan industry);
Jerry E. Serlin, Auditing Developments, J. Acr., AUDITING & FIN., Fall 1985, at 74, 75
(quoting SEC Enforcement Division's chief accountant as saying that "opinion shopping
remains a serious problem"); Mindy Jaffe Smolevitz, Note, The Opinion Shopping
Phenomenon: Corporate America's Search for the Perfect Auditor, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 1077,
1080 (1987) (noting that before SEC rule changes, the number of companies switching auditors
rose 82% between 1981 and 1985, indicating that opinion shopping was on the rise).
Among other infamous examples of instances where opinion shopping seemed to play a
part in egregious frauds are the Penn Square Bank case, PHILLIP L. ZWEIG, BELLY UP: THE
COLLAPSE OF THE PENN SQUARE BANK 174,258-59 (1985), and the Silverado Savings & Loan
case, William Steinberg, Cooked Books, ATLANTIC, Jan. 1992, at 20, 26 (noting that bank
examiners found the Silverado scandal, which engulfed President Bush's son Neil, a "clear
example" of opinion shopping).
171 See Prentice, Irrational Auditor, supra note 160, at 209.
172 To Financial, PR NEWSWIRE, June 19, 1984, at *2 (reporting results of survey
commissioned by then-Big Eight firm Peat Marwick).
173 See BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT, supra note 38, at 101 (noting that instead of being guilty
of intentional wrongdoing, Coopers & Lybrand "may have been guilty of the motivational bias
of egocentrically interpreting and searching for data in order to maintain the client
relationship").
174 See Robert Tie, Concerns Over Auditing Quality Complicate the Future of
Accounting, J. ACCT., Dec. 1999, at 14 (noting AICPA numbers claiming that 99.7% of
financial reports are problem-free each year and complaints are raised annually as to only 50 of
15,000 SEC registrants).
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of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) believes that there is "no evidence that
audit failure has been caused by a lack of independence," 175 problems are
apparent. In fiscal year 1999, the SEC brought ninety enforcement actions
alleging financial fraud and indicating "busted audits. ' 176 Arthur Levitt recently
observed that we find ourselves "witnessing a gradual, but noticeable erosion in
175 AICPA, WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 10. The studies discussed in the remainder of
this section provide strong evidence to refute this AICPA conclusion. Nonetheless, the AICPA
does validly argue that (a) it is difficult to find specific audit failures that can be traced
unequivocally to the provision of additional nonaudit services, (b) insurance companies do not
via their premium structure indicate that they believe that the provision of nonaudit services
increased the risk of loss, AICPA, WHrrE PAPER, supra note 10, at 10, and (c) numerous studies
of the audit profession done in recent years, not all of them commissioned by the AICPA, id at
12, have failed to find "'conclusive evidence of diminished audit quality or harm to the public
interest, or any actual impairment of auditor independence, as a consequence of public
accounting firms providing advisory or consulting services to their clients."' Id at 50 (quoting
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: MAJOR ISSUES: PROGRESS AND
CONCERNS 41-42 (Sept 1996) (Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on
Commerce, House of Representatives)).
The AICPA position has flaws. For example, the AICPA emphasizes that few lawsuit
complaints against auditors mention whether the auditors receive nonaudit revenue from the
clients whose audits they allegedly botched. Because it is perfectly legal to accept nonaudit
revenue from those clients, it is not surprising that few complaints would mention it. This is
especially true given that courts hold, perhaps erroneously in light of the evidence presented in
the studies on auditor self-serving bias, that alleging that auditors intentionally botched audits in
order to preserve a client's stream of revenue (whether audit or nonaudit) is irrelevant to
establishing the scienter element of a lOb-5 claim. See generally Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d
1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78mm (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
Moreover, proving the link in any specific case between auditor lapses and their incentives
to collect nonaudit revenue is very hard given the difficulty of showing what went on in
individual auditors' brains. As the chair of the National Association of State Boards of
Accountancy recently noted, the SEC will not find a "smoking gun" so long as most cases are
settled or otherwise closed through the work of skilled attorneys, so while "[t]here is not going
to be any clear evidence ... the SEC needs to make policy decisions on the basis of the reality
of public perception." John Herzfeld, Auditor Independence: Meyer, Volcker Lead Off
Testimony Supporting SEC Independence Proposal, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Sept. 14, 2000,
available in LEXIS, Nexis, BNA Library, BNASLD File. See also Lorie Soares, Note, The Big
Eight: Management Consulting and Independence: Myth or Reality?, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1511,
1529-31 (1988) (exploring numerous explanations for lack of hard evidence between provision
of consulting services and independence violations). Nonetheless, as this article is being edited,
the SEC has begun a probe that may establish a link between Arthur Andersen's allegedly
sloppy auditing of Waste Management and the big consulting fees it was pocketing from the
same client. See Michael Schroeder, SEC Probes Andersen for Conflict ofInterest, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 25, 2000, at CI (detailing investigation).
176 Judith Bums, SEC Targets Auditors Who Wear Blinkers, NAT'L POST, Dec. 8, 1999, at
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quality of financial reporting."'1 77 "Earnings management" has reached crisis
proportions, 78 causing Levitt to wonder "whether accounting firms have become
more concerned with their own financial statements and less so with their
clients." 179 Not only the Commission is concerned. Louis Lowenstein recently
noted: "the SEC has been seeing a vast amount of cheerleading for clients by the
very accountants on whose independence we rely. The accountants have come to
see their auditing work less as a profit-center guided by professionalism than as a
lever for obtaining more lucrative consulting assignments."'1 80 Numerous
observers believe that the accountants' self-serving drive for revenue has
overridden legitimate conflict-of-interest concerns.1 81
These concerns have been fueled by several recent audit failures that were
striking in their scope.182 Auditors failed to detect $500 million of fake revenue
177 Audit Committees: Financial Reporting Pressures Affecting Independent Directors,
Levitt Says, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Apr. 23, 1999, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNASLD
File (quoting SEC Chair Arthur Levitt).
178 By December of 1999, 53 firms had restated earnings, some more than once. Bums,
supra note 176, at Cl 1.
179 Auditors: 'Earnings Management' May Suffer For Accounting Firms' Profits, Levitt
Says, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Oct. 12,1999, available in LEXIS, BNA library, BNASLD file.
180 Lowenstein, Paparazzi, supra note 9, at 52. See also Sean Somerville, Pressuring
Accountants to Be More Accountable, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 7, 1999, at 1D-2D (noting
accounting professor Abraham Briloff's observation that getting tough on an audit client can
cost the audit firm not only audit fees but also management consulting fees, which can account
for more than 50% of the firm's revenue thus raising the stakes).
181 E.g., Norman Bowie, Accountants, Full Disclosure, and Conflicts ofInterest, 5 Bus. &
PROF. ETHICS J. 60, 68 (1986) ("It seems obvious that the competition for clients has
overshadowed the concerns regarding conflicts of interest."). See Jonathan Burton, When
Earnings Bear Closer Scrutiny: What Should CEOs Do to Avoid Embarrassing Blow-Ups over
Reported Earningsl CHIEF EXECUTIVE, May 1, 1999, at 144 (quoting Warren Buffett as
observing that "[t]hough auditors should regard the investing public as their client they tend to
kowtow instead to the managers who choose them and dole out their pay"); LAWLER & RHODE,
supra note 166, at 132 ("The emphasis in most CPA firms seems to be holding on to all clients
even if they compromise the practice."); Robert E. Seiler, Competition and Independence,
C.P.A. J., Oct. 1987, at 4 ('The stage has been set for commercialism to take the place of
professionalism.").
182 See, e.g., Michael Bologna, Waste Management Agrees to $220 Million Settlement of
Shareholder Class Action Suits, BNA CORP. COUNSEL DAILY, Dec. 11, 1998, at B2 (noting that
Arthur Andersen and Waste Management had agreed to a $220 million settlement after
allowing Waste Management to overstate income by $1.32 billion between 1991 and 1997);
Lee Gomes, Informix to Settle Holder Suits for $142 Million, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1999, at
BI 1 (noting that Ernst & Young had kicked in the biggest part of a $142 million cash
settlement following a botched audit of Informix Corp.); Elizabeth MacDonald, Jackson
NationalAlleges Ernst BotchedAudit ofElectronics Firm, Causing Loss, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30,
1999, at B5 (noting botched audit of Kent Intemational Associates allowing the firm to
overstate sales by approximately 50%); Dean Starkman, BDO Seidman Is Sued Over Auditing
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generated by CUC International, Inc. (which became Cendant Corporation) over
a three-year period.183 When Sunbeam restated its 1997 results that had been
certified by Arthur Andersen, profits dropped from $123.1 million to $6.8
million; a year later Sunbeam's market capitalization had dropped from $4.3
billion to $567 million.184 Livent, Inc. perpetrated a criminal fraud so massive
that it required specially tailored software to carry out exhaustive manipulations
and two sets of books to keep track of the fraud.185 These cases are but a
sampling; of 235 class action securities fraud cases filed in 1998, 65% alleged
accounting problems.186 The chief accountant for the SEC's enforcement division
recently decried the "awful" accounting standards being applied in disclosure
documents and accused independent auditors of "falling down on the job."'1 7 He
has also noted that "the [SEC] staff is beginning to see . .. instances of clear-cut
violations of simple and well-known rules. It is easy to be skeptical about firms'
independence safeguards when the most basic rules are not followed."1 88
When surveyed, auditors themselves admit to a startlingly high number of
"premature sign-offs," where they sign workpapers indicating that they have
performed steps in the audit procedure that they did not in fact perform.' 8 9 The
of A.R. Baron by Ex-Broker's Trustee, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1998, at B13 (noting claim that
auditor had missed millions of dollars in cash bribes as well as payments to prostitutes, and had
failed to note an increase in claims by customers from $1.8 million to $80 million in just two
years).
183 Emily Nelson & Elizabeth MacDonald, Cendant Corp. Sues Ernst & Young, Charging
Firm Failed to Detect Fraud, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1999, at B 11; Floyd Norris, Asleep at the
Books: A Fraud that Went On and On and On, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2000, at CI (wondering:
"Were the books ever honest at CUC International?").
184 Burton, supra note 181, at 144.
185 Richard Melcher, Is Fraud the Thing?, Bus. WK., Feb. 15, 1999, at 104, 106.
186 Garrett Glaser, Large Number of Cases of Improper or Illegal Accounting Practices
and the Effect They Have on Companies and Their Stock; CNBC NEWS TRANSCRIPTS, June 8,
1999, at *1, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, News Group File (reporting on Stanford
study).
187 Neil Hare, Insider Trading: SEC to Issue Insider Trading Proposals by 'End of Year,'
Enforcement Chief Says, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Nov. 15, 1999, at *1, available in LEXIS, BNA
Library, BNASLD File.
188 Lynn E. Turner & Joseph H. Godwin, Auditing, Earnings Management, and
International Accounting Issues at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 Accr.
HORIzONs 281, 284 (1999).
189 C. Wayne Alderman & James W. Deitrick, Auditors' Perceptions of Tune Budget
Pressures and Premature Sign-Offs: A Replication and Extension, AUDING: J. OF PRAC. &
THEORY, Winter 1982, at 54,60 (finding that 31% of auditors surveyed believed that in general
some auditors sign-off prematurely); Kelley & Margheim, supra note 162, at 22 (concluding
from auditors' admissions "that an alarming number of ... audit quality reduction acts are
occurring in practice"). See generally JOHN G. RHODE, SURVEY ON THE INFLUENCE OF
SELEcrED ASPECrS OF THE AuDroR's WORK ENVIRONMENT ON PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE
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premature sign-offs are conscious decisions to violate the norms of good auditing
practice. But, again, subconscious factors are likely the more significant. As the
psychology literature outlined earlier in the article demonstrates, even when an
auditor is trying to be objective, the unconscious effects of the self-serving bias
will dramatically affect how that auditor perceives, processes, and remembers
information. The strong motivation to please the client in order to keep the client
and attendant revenues is bound to color any auditor's judgment.
The rest of this section examines a substantial body of behavioral literature
demonstrating the pervasive and corrosive impact of the self-serving bias upon
auditors. The discussion is organized by type of research. Virtually every type of
study that has been done supports the conclusion that the self-serving bias
pervades auditor judgment and performance; 190 only suitable counterincentives
seem capable of offsetting these effects.
B. Nonaudit Laboratory Studies
Several laboratory studies have been done that study the behavior of
accountants outside the audit setting. In these other contexts, such as consulting
and tax work, accountants are expected to act with objectivity, though not
independence. 191
OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC AccOuNTANTs: A STUDY AND REPORT FOR THE COMMISSION ON
AUDITORS' RESPONSIliTIs (1977) (reporting that 60% of respondents admitted to reporting
that they had performed certain audit procedures that in fact they had not completed).
190 This article omits studies based on pure economic modeling for two reasons. First,
they assume rather than provide evidence that auditors act in a self-serving capacity. Obviously,
in traditional economic analysis, all people are presumed to be rational maximizers of their
expected utility. Thomas S. Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law,
12 HAMLINE L. REV. 385, 386 (1989) (explaining different assumptions that are made about
cognitive abilities when the conventional model is used); William S. Waller, Decision-Making
Research in Managerial Accounting: Return to Behavioral-Economics Foundations, in
JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND AUDING 29, 32 (Robert
H. Ashton & Alison H. Ashton eds., 1995) ('Individuals are assumed to act as ifthey maximize
expected utility."). Second, economic modeling has inherent limitations. See generally James R.
Boatsman et a., A Perspective on the Use of Laboratory Market Experimentation in Auditing
Research, 67 Accr. REv. 148 (1992) (analyzing multiple weaknesses of use of economic
models).
The economic modeling that has been done is not inconsistent with the other studies
discussed in this paper. See, e.g., Ella Mae Matsumura et al., Strategic Auditor Behavior and
Going-Concern Decisions, 24 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCr. 727, 751 (1997) (reasoning that an
incumbent auditor is less likely to issue a going concern opinion if it expects to keep a client);
Tucker & Matsumura, supra note 168, at 213 (noting that auditors are more likely to maintain
independence and reporting integrity when they face large potential liability losses for reporting
errors).
191 AICPA, PROF'L STANDARDS ET § 55, Art. IV (1999) ("A member should maintain
objectivity and be free of conflicts of interest in discharging professional responsibilities?).
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For example, Ponemon conducted a laboratory study of the objectivity of
accountants' litigation support judgments.1 92 He studied accountants with and
without litigation support experience, asking them to judge from a realistic factual
scenario the dollar amount of inventory loss that an insured had suffered in a fire.
Whether they had low or high experience, litigation support accountants acted as
the self-serving bias would predict-those assigned the role of plaintiff's expert
set a higher amount of loss (overall mean $7,367,715) than those assigned the role
of the defendant's expert (overall mean $5,996,894), while those assigned the role
of a court-appointed expert set numbers between the other two (overall mean
$6,594,394).193 The study's results for auditors without litigation support
experience showed a similar pattern (plaintiff's expert means were greater than
court-appointed expert means which were, in turn, greater than defendant's expert
means), although the bias effect was not as pronounced. 194 Relatively higher
levels of ethical sensitivity and experience had some impact on the results.195
Ponemon's study indicated "that accountants favor their client's economic
interests," 196 and concluded that "the bias in accounting estimates provided by
litigation specialists in this experiment may indicate a tendency for some
individuals to subordinate their judgments."'197
Cuccia, Hackenbrack, and Nelson conducted a similar study in the tax
field.' 98 They gave some of their subjects, tax managers from then-Big Six firms,
incentives to report aggressively and then varied the specificity of the professional
standard in order to determine whether reducing the vagueness in such standards
would reduce aggressive reporting. They found that when tax professionals were
incentivized to report aggressively, they reported more aggressively than their
peers who were not so incentivized regardless of the specificity of the standards.
If the standards were vague, subjects used the vagueness to justify their
aggressive position. If the standards were more specific, they changed their
assessments of evidential support to justify aggressive reporting.199 "Given an
aggressive incentive, subjects made aggressive disclosures, regardless of the level
and precision of the [professional] standard."200 Clearly, the self-serving bias was
at work here, distorting both judgment and perceptions of factual evidence.
192 Ponemon, supra note 93, at 467.
193 Id. at 479 (Table 3).
194 Id. at481 (Table 4).
195 Id. at 484.
196 11 at 484.
197 Id. at 484-85.
198 See generally Andrew D. Cuccia et al., The Ability of Professional Standards to
MitigateAggressive Reporting, 70 ACCr. REV. 227 (1995).
199 Id. at 243-44.
200 Id. at 241.
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Research has suggested that in the tax field, "clients expect preparers to
assist them in taking the most favorable tax positions on their returns ... and that
preparers understand and attempt to meet this expectation."201 Johnson found that
subjects asked to assess the relevance of cases to their client's issue judged cases
supporting their client's position to be more relevant than cases undermining it.2 02
In a similar vein, Cloyd and Spilker studied tax professionals from Big Five
firms who were informed of their client's preferred tax position. After studying
provided precedents, one-half recommended the client-preferred position, even
though a panel of experts concluded that there was only a 14% chance that the
position would be sustained if challenged.203 Professor Ahlawat performed a
similar study of internal and outsource auditors, finding both (especially the
former) to be partial to their clients' interests rather than objective.2 04
These various studies are completely consistent with the self-serving bias and
not particularly consistent with the objectivity both consultants and tax
professionals are supposed to exhibit. Although, the AICPA has accepted that
consultants and tax professionals may act as advocates for their clients and need
not be independent,20 5 nonetheless, they are supposed to be objective and the
evidence casts doubt on their ability to remain so. 06
201 Linda M. Johnson, An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Advocacy on
Preparers' Evaluations of Judicial Evidence, 15 J. AM. TAX Assoc. 1, 6 (1993) (citation
oritted).
202 Id. at 18.
203 C. Bryan Cloyd & Brian C. Spilker, The Influence of Client Preferences on Tax
Professionals' Search for Judicial Precedents, Subsequent Judgments and Recommendations,
74 Accr. REv. 299, 301 (1999) (noting that their results suggest "that information search biases
induced by client preferences can be strong enough to not only result in inaccurate assessments
of authoritative support for the client-favored position, which is problematic in and of itself, but
also to lead tax professionals to make overly aggressive recommendations"). Cloyd and Spilker
attribute much of this effect to the confirmation bias. I
204 Sunita Ahlawat, Internal Auditor Objectivity: In-house versus Outsource (2000)
(unpublished Working Paper on file with author).
205 See Adrian Harrell et al., An Examination of Management's Ability to Bias the
Professional Objectivity ofInternalAuditors, 14 Acr., ORGS. & Soc. 259,267 (1989) (finding
that regarding internal auditors, study participants who were not members of the Institute of
Internal Auditors were biased by knowledge of management's desired outcomes, but members
of the Institute resisted management pressure).
2 06 Tax professionals, for example, are required by both IRS rules and AICPA standards
to recommend only tax positions that have a realistic possibility of success. AICPA, PROF'L
STANDARDs TX. § 112.02 (1999) ("A CPA should not recommend to a client that a position to
be taken with respect to the tax treatment of any item on a return unless the CPA has a good
faith belief that the position has a realistic possibility of being sustained administratively or
judicially on its merits if challenged?); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (stating that judgments are
to be based on "reasonable and well-informed analysis" which is satisfied when it could be
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C. Audit Laboratory Studies
Relevant laboratory studies have also targeted auditing activity. For example,
Haynes and her colleagues asked ninety six Certified Public Accountants (CPAs)
to value inventory in a takeover setting.2 07 Those simply told that the buyer was a
long-time client tended to value the inventory the same as those told the seller was
a long-time client. However, when the auditors were told that the results of the
valuation were important to their client's bargaining position in the negotiations
surrounding the takeover, they became advocates for their clients even without
being told the client's preferred position, and the impact was greater among
auditors with more experience.208 In other words, "with experience, participants'
judgments become more consistent with client interests;"209 thus auditors
voluntarily become advocates for their clients rather than watchdogs for the
public.
In another study, Farmer and his colleagues examined, among other factors,
the impact of economic considerations on audit independence. 210 They asked
practicing auditors of varying levels (partner, manager, etc.) to rank attributes
thought to affect auditor independence and to perform an audit case evaluation. A
primary finding was that "[b]y almost a 2 to 1 ratio, the auditors are more willing
to accept the client's proposed treatment in situations where the perceived risk of
client loss is high versus a situation in which the perceived risk of client loss was
low."2 11 Subjects were most likely to accede to the client's wishes when the risk
of client loss was high and the risk of litigation was low.2 12 One of the most
interesting findings of the study was that the lower level auditors valued
independence most highly, whereas those accountants at the higher echelons of
the firm who were more likely directly affected by loss of a client valued it
less.2 13 The authors' ultimate conclusion was that "[i]f society expects auditors to
be more accountable to third party users, as opposed to advocates of client
positions, then it is clear that the economic dependence on clients should continue
to be monitored."2 14
reasonably concluded "that the position has approximately a one in three, or greater, likelihood
ofbeing sustained on its merits").
20 7 See generally Haynes et aL, supra note 165.
208 Id at 100.
20 9 Id at 98.
210 Timothy A. Farmer et al., An Investigation of the Impact of Economic and
Organizational Factors on Auditor Independence, 7 AUDITING: J. OF PRAC. & THEORY, Fall
1987, at 1.
211 Id. at8.
212 Id
2 1 3 Id. at 10.
214 Id at 11.
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Salterio and Koonce studied the persuasiveness of audit evidence in a
laboratory setting with practicing audit managers and partners from a Canadian
Big Six accounting firm.2 15 They found that when all available precedents
pointed to a given position, the auditors did not heed their client's inconsistent
desires. However, when available precedents were mixed, auditors tended to
follow their clients' position when it was known, suggesting to the authors "that
conflicting precedents provide the basis for the auditor to side with the client
which, in turn, may give the appearance of a lack of independence."2 16 So,
consistent with more general studies reported earlier,217 when given "wiggle
room," the auditors tended to follow their self-interest by giving clients what they
wanted.218
Hackenbrack and Nelson studied allegations that auditors were allowing their
clients to adopt aggressive reporting methods when the auditors had incentive to
do so.219 They presented practicing auditors with an ambiguous accounting
215 See generally S. Salterio & L. Koonce, The Persuasiveness of Audit Evidence: The
Case ofAccounting Policy Decisions, 22 Accr., ORGS. & SOC'Y 573 (1997).
216 Id. at 585 (citation omitted). The authors go on to note:
This result also may have regulatory implications. That is, to the extent the regulators
initially do not deny different accounting treatments of a similar transaction as revealed in
financial statement disclosures, then they set the stage for auditors (who observe these
conflicting precedents) to agree with their clients. Again, while independence in fact may not be
compromised (because the client has valid reasons for a choice of accounting treatment), the
appearance of a lack of independence may surface in these instances. Given the relatively large
number of instances in which conflicting precedents are available (38.5%) this may be of
concern to the public accounting profession. Heightening this concern is the increased use of
precedents by company management to convince their auditors to disregard national office
advice.
Id (citations omitted).
2 17 See supra Part III.B.
218 The Salterio & Koonce study was roughly consistent with an earlier study by Salterio
of auditors' tendency to be persuaded by clients. Salterio used both archival data, which
suggested an indirect influence, and an experiment, which found no direct influence. However,
the experiment's results may well have been accounted for by the fact that overwhelming
precedents conflicted with the clients' preferred accounting treatment See generally Steven
Salterio, The Effects of Precedents and Client Position on Auditors' Financial Accounting
Policy Judgment, 21 ACC., ORGS. & SOC'V 467 (1996).
Similarly, Trompeter studied client influence and determined that audit judgments were
more influenced by client preferences when GAAP was ambiguous than when it offered clear
guidance. See generally Greg Trompeter, The Effect of Partner Compensation Schemes and
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles on Audit Partner Judgment, 13 AUDMING: J. OF
PRACnCE & THEORY 56 (Fall 1994). To reiterate, the human ability to rationalize is not
unlimited, especially in light of potential legal liability, which Trompeter's study found to be a
significant variable. Id at 64.
2 19 See generally Karl Hackenbrack & Mark W. Nelson, Auditors' Incentives and Their
Application ofFinancialAccounting Standards, 71 ACCT. REV. 43 (1996).
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situation. They found that the auditors acted in a manner consistent with the self-
serving bias in that they used aggressive interpretations of accounting standards to
allow their clients to take aggressive positions when the auditors' engagement risk
(risk of fines, censure, litigation, loss of reputation, etc.) was moderate, but used
conservative interpretations of the same standards in order to require conservative
positions by their clients when the auditors' engagement risk was high.220 Thus,
"auditors' incentives influenced their reporting decisions," again consistent with
the self-serving bias.2 21
Lord studied experienced audit managers in a laboratory setting.2 22 His
primary purpose was to determine the effect that accountability had on auditors'
decisions whether to submit to client pressure for improper accounting trealment
However, his results also indicated that the amount of competition for the client
the provision of non-attest services to the client and the importance of the client
in terms of amount of revenue contributed to the firm were significant variables in
determining aggressiveness of reporting. 223 Roberts and Cargile did a similar
study of auditor response to self-serving incentives and derived similar results.2 24
Windsor and Ashkanasy used practicing auditors to study the impact on
auditor decision-maling of the interaction between client economic factors, moral
reasoning development and belief in a just world.2 25 Their studies hypothesized
that client economic factors, such as size of audit fee and financial condition of
the client would interact with the auditors' moral reasoning development (using
Kohlberg's six stages of moral reasoning development)226 and with their just
220 Id at 54.
221 Id. at 45.
222 Alan T. Lord, Pressure: A Methodological Consideration for Behavioral Research in
Auditing, 11 AuDITING: J. OF PRAC. & THEORY, Fall 1992, at 89 [hereinafter Lord, Pressure].
2 2 3 Id. at 97-103.
224 See generally M.L. Roberts & B.R. Cargile, Impartiality Versus Advocacy: CPA's
Responses to Conflict in Auditing and Tax Situations (unpublished Working Paper, University
of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL). As reported by Hackenbrack & Nelson:
They [Roberts and Cargile] required a sample of auditors (mostly from small audit firms)
to rate the degree to which they would allow a client to capitalize an (unspecified) expenditure
as a betterment rather than expense it as a repair. The strength of the client's operating
performance, the risk of client loss, and the potential for detection of aggressive reporting by a
third party were manipulated within-subjects, and context (tax, auditing) was manipulated
between-subjects. Although subjects were informed that they were to use their professional
judgment to make this determination, they were provided no evidence or professional standards
on which to base their judgment other than the incentive factors. All manipulated variables were
reported to be significant in interactions.
Hackenbrack & Nelson, supra note 219, at 46 (emphasis added).
225 Windsor & Ashkanasy, The Effect, supra note 163, at 701.
226 See Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Development Approach
to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 347-80 (David
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world view2 27 to impact their decisions whether to acquiesce to client requests for
inappropriate accounting treatment Only auditors with the highest level of moral
reasoning development and a just world view resisted client management power.
All auditors without a just world view and auditors not at the highest levels of
moral reasoning with a just world view were subject in various degrees, to client
management pressure.228 Furthermore, the authors allowed that in light of
evidence from the real world (lawsuits, scandals, etc.) "the results of this research
may underestimate the real extent of auditor acquiescence in practice. '2 29
Laboratory studies are numerous, 230 but they only go so far.231 These results
may certainly be questioned because subjects are usually given anonymity. Lord
Goslin ed., 1969). Windsor and Ashkanasy predicted (and found evidence to support the
notion) that auditors with more highly developed moral reasoning would be more resistant to
management pressure. See generally Windsor & Ashkanasy, The Effect, supra note 163.
227 There is substantial evidence that people's actions are significantly affected by whether
they believe they live in a just world. If they do, they tend to act as though they have control
over their own fate and they are more able to give up immediate benefits in exchange for long-
term good. If they do not, they tend to act as if they have little control over life's events, and
therefore, they are less likely to take a long-term view. See generally M.J. LERNER, THE BELIEF
INA JUST WORLD (1980).
228 Windsor & Ashkanasy, The Effect, supra note 163, at 715. Regarding those auditors
with the lowest level of moral development and an unjust world view, Windsor and Ashkanasy
found:
It appears that, for auditors in this category, personal beliefs combine with economic
considerations to increase any tendency to acquiesce to the wishes of client management In
effect, this group appears to have had neither the philosophical fortitude of the autonomous
[highest moral development] group, nor the practical self-interest of the pragmatic [middle
moral development] group necessary to withstand client management power.
Id.
229 Id. at 716.
230 There are other studies, besides the ones mentioned in the text. For example, one study
asked auditors how many hours would be required to do a particular audit. Others were asked
the same question, but informed that time pressure was a factor. These auditors generally
concluded that less time was needed to do the audit. The authors concluded that "[fjrom the
results it can be inferred that auditors were influenced by time pressures to reduce budgeted
hours, which may adversely affect quality control and lead to staff morale and turnover
problems." George F. Kermis & S. Mahapatra, An Empirical Study of the Effects of Time
Pressure on Audit Time Allocations, 2 ADVANCES N ACCr. 261, 272 (1985). Thus, it appears
that client pressure to reduce audit budgets induces auditors to conclude that fewer hours are
needed to perform an adequate audit. This is arguably a manifestation of the self-serving bias's
impact upon human judgment.
231 They are especially limited when subjects are students. See Jeffrey W. Schatzberg et
a., Exploratory Experimental Evidence on Independence Impairment Conditions: Aggregate
and Individual Results, 8 BEHAV. RES. IN ACCr. 173, 191 (Supp. 1996) (reporting results of
laboratory study involving accounting students that found impaired independence to be strongly
associated with the existence of three conditions-differential reporting behavior by auditors,
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has found evidence indicating that subjects given anonymity are less likely to
issue a qualified opinion than subjects who were held accountable for their
decisions.2 32 On the other hand, some studies show that imposing accountability
produces few changes in result; 233 furthermore, these laboratory studies are
consistent with the self-serving behavior accounting firms exhibit in the real
world.
D. Empirical Studies ofActual Auditor Behavior
As noted earlier, if the self-serving bias affects auditors, one would expect to
see auditors more willing to subordinate objectivity and independence in order to
resolve accounting conflicts in favor of their clients, less willing to give qualified
opinions, including going concern qualifications, and less willing to resign from
accounts the more income they derive from that client. On the other hand, a
higher risk of litigation exposure should move auditor behavior in the opposite
direction. Laboratory experiments discussed earlier have produced results
consistent with these effects, and the empirical evidence of actual auditor
behavior seems to do the same.
For example, Wright and Wright hypothesized that to maintain an ongoing
relationship with a client, auditors who find current period adjustments that they
think need to be made to the client's financial statement may waive those
adjustments that will disadvantage the client's financial position.2 34 One of their
hypotheses was that audit adjustments were more likely to be waived as the size
of the client, and hence the size of the client's stream of future potential revenue
to the auditor, increased. They studied a sample of 186 audits in detail and found a
existence of future quasi-rents that accrue to an incumbent auditor, and a net benefit to the
auditorfor impairing his independence).
232 Lord, Pressure, supra note 222, at 103.
233 In general studies of heuristics and biases, researchers have tried to improve
performance by increasing the accountability of subjects in experiments. They have generally
been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: The Neglected Social Context of
Judgment and Choice, 7 RES. IN ORG. BEHAV. 297, 324 (1985) ("Demands for accountability
may sometimes motivate people to 'bolster' previous decisions, to be overconfident in the
correctness of those decisions, to 'over-assimilate' new evidence, and to deny difficult value
trade-offs, particularly when the trade-offs require acknowledging flaws in past decisions and
judgments."); Philip E. Tetlock & Richard Boettger, Accountability: A Social Magnifier of the
Dilution Effect, 57 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 388, 388 (1989) ('The accountability
manipulation motivated subjects to use a wide range of information in making judgments, but
did not make them more discriminating judges of the usefulness of that information.").
234 Arold Wright & Sally Wright, An Examination of Factors Affecting the Decision to
WaiveAudit Adjustments, 12 1 ACCr., AUDrrING & FIN. 15,20-21 (1997).
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substantial percentage of waivers of adjustments.23 5 They also found "[a] strong
positive association ... between the likelihood an adjustment was waived and
client size, a surrogate for audit fees."'23 6
Krishnan and Krishnan modeled the decision to render a qualified opinion as
a two-stage process 37 First is the intellectual decision that the client deserves a
qualified opinion. Second is the practical decision to actually render the qualified
opinion. They created a model that took into account various factors that might
affect the second stage of the process, including the relative importance of the
client's stream of revenue to the auditor. They then tested their model empirically
by using data involving 1,837 public companies. Their findings were quite
consistent with the self-serving bias. Given that a client is a potential recipient of a
qualified opinion, their study found that an audit firm is more likely to issue a
qualified opinion "the higher the litigation risk ... [and] the lower the client's
decile position in the auditor's portfolio."238
Citron and Taffler suspected that a possible explanation for auditors'
reluctance to issue going concern qualifications is "to preserve their future
economic interest in the client, unless the likelihood of failure is in fact very
great."239 They did an empirical study covering ten years' worth of going concern
qualifications in the United Kingdom and found support for this surmise-only
26% of companies that failed had been issued a going concern qualification prior
to their bankruptcy, and those companies tended to be both in a very weak
financial position and in imminent danger of failing.240
The problem is only partly the difficulty of forecasting business failures;
models exist that apparently make such forecasts with a reasonable degree of
235 Id at 32 ("Of concern was that a number of adjustments greater than planning
materiality were subsequently waived (47.5%), suggesting the potential for financial reporting
risk.").
23 6 Id. at 33. However, this finding was mitigated to some extent in that the study did not
show a preferential treatment for larger client in terms of higher profits. Id. In other words,
when one looks at the total income effects of the waivers that were granted, smaller companies
did as well as larger companies, roughly speaking. Id at 31.
237 Jagan Krishnan & Jayanthi Krishnan, The Role of Economic Trade-Offs in the Audit
Opinion Decision: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 11 J. ACCT., AUDrING & FIN. 565,565 (1996).
23 8 Id at 583. However, because of the limitations inherent in a study such as this, the
authors were reluctant to draw explicit conclusions about auditor independence. Id.
239 David B. Citron & Richard . Taffler, The Audit Report under Going Concern
Uncertainties: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 22 Accr. & Bus. RES. 337, 344 (1992).
240 Id. Some numbers in the United States are better. Id. at 340 n.15 (noting another study
which found a higher percentage, 48%, of going concern qualifications among a small sample
of failed U.S. companies). Yet, 28 of the 30 Califomia savings and loans that cratered in 1985
and 1986 did so under the banner of clean audit opinions issued in their most recent audit.
Steinberg, supra note 170, at 20.
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accuracy.241 The difficulty of making such forecasts seems to be supplemented
substantially by auditor reluctance to blow the whistle on a struggling client. As
adverted to earlier, when Campisi and Trotman asked experienced Australian
auditors to study case histories, the auditors reached a high degree of consensus
on whether a company had going concern problems.2 42 The experts agreed that in
36% of the cases they evaluated, qualified opinions were warranted. Yet in
practice none of the cases had been qualified, indicating that factors other than the
merits drove the auditors' ultimate decisions to qualify or not qualify.243
Kida's earlier study found both that auditors could efficiently detect going
concern problems,244 and that they often refrained from issuing qualified opinions
when they were warranted.245 Surmising that the consequences of issuing a
qualified opinion might account for this gap,246 Kida surveyed the auditors he
studied and found that those who issued fewer qualified opinions tended to be
more worried about deteriorating relations with clients and losing clients
altogether, among other factors.247 Barnes and Huan extended Kida's study with
their own involving United Kingdom auditors and again found that auditors have
a good sense of when a company's financial statements should be qualified but
often do not do so for self-serving reasons2 48 Their finding supported the
conclusion "that an auditor's self-interest considerations help explain his
241 See, e.g., Edward I. Altman & Thomas P. McGough, Evaluation of a Company as a
Going Concern, J. ACCr., Dec. 1974, at 50, 53 (finding only 44% accuracy in going concem
assessments by auditors in the U.S. even though a model produced by one of the authors
predicted bankruptcy with 82% accuracy). See also Nicholas Dopuch et al., Predicting Audit
Qualifications with Financial and Market Variables, 62 Acer. REv. 431, 431 (1987)
(proposing a model using firms' financial and stock market variables to judge when opinions
should be qualified and what sorts of qualified opinions are appropriate). But see W.S.
Hopwood et al., A Reexamination ofAuditor Versus Model Accuracy within the Context of the
Going-Concern Opinion Decision, 10 CONTEMP. ACCT. REs. 409, 425-26 (1994) (arguing that
neither auditors nor financial distress models are particularly accurate predictors of irmninent
insolvency).
242 Campisi & Trotman, supra note 15, at 308.
243 Id. at 309.
244 Kida, supra note 93, at 520.
245 In Kida's study, a qualification or disclaimer was not rendered, on average, 24.6% of
the time that problems were indicated. Id at 520.
2 46 Id at 506. ("Factors other than the likelihood of problems, such as the perceived
consequences of qualifying, may be considered by auditors before a qualified opinion is
issued.").
247 Id at 516.
248 Paul Barnes & Hooi Den Huan, The Auditor's Going Concern Decision: Some UK
Evidence Concerning Independence and Competence, 20 J. Bus. FIN. & Accr. 213, 226
(1993).
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decision ' 2 49 to refrain from qualifying a client's financial statements and that "the
auditor may be seen as any other economic agent in which his decisions are
determined by economic pressures." 250
McKeown and his colleagues studied the problem that more than half of
companies go bankrupt do so under the flag of clean audit opinions.251 After
studying many bankruptcies, they determined that one of the variables that
seemed important in whether or not auditors issued going concern opinions was
client size, concluding that their finding "raises the issue as to whether auditors'
independence is influenced by the size of the client e.g., that the auditor may be
bowing to client pressure or, even in the absence of pressure, that the auditor does
not want to face loss of the audit fee."2 52
Relatedly, when the Big Six accounting finns lobbied Congress for
protection from lawsuits, ultimately gaining passage of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998 (SLUSA),2 53 they argued that they were being forced to resign from
accounts because of litigation risk. However, a recent study by Scholz found that
litigation risk was not correlated with auditor resignations unless the client was in
relatively poor financial condition. If the client was bringing in a nice stream of
revenue and was not in danger of failing, litigation risk did not induce
resignation.254
Shaub and Lawrence studied 156 auditors in order to examine the interplay of
ethics, experience, and professional skepticism, a key to independence.2 55
Consistent with other studies, they found that "auditors' professional skepticism
was found to be counteracted when the client was important to the audit firm's
practice development."256
249 Id
250 Id.
251 James C. McKeown et al., Towards an Explanation ofAuditor Failure to Modify the
Audit Opinions ofBanb-upt Companies, 10 AuDrING: J. OF PRAC. & THEORY, supp. 1991, at 1,
1.
252 Id. at 11.
253 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (1998). SLUSA mandates that most securities fraud class action suits be filed in
federal court so that plaintiffs' attorneys cannot escape the limitations that the Public Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) placed on securities fraud suits by filing such suits in state
court. See also PSLRA, 109 Stat. 737 (current version with additions and amendments at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77-78 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (Supp. 11995)).
254 Susan Scholz, Auditor Litigation Risk and Auditor Resignations: Some Empirical
Evidence (1997) (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation on file with author).
255 Michael K. Shaub & Janice E. Lawrence, Ethics, Experience and Professional
Skepticism, 8 BEHAV. RES. iN Accr. 124, 155 (Supp. 1996).
256 Id.
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Carcello and his colleagues surveyed senior managers and partners of CPA
fUins 2 57 Most claimed never to have witnessed the inappropriate behaviors that
Carcello et al. inquired about, however, 25% did admit that they had observed
inadequate workpaper review, and large client size was one of the key factors
strongly associated with this General Accounting and Auditing Standards
(GAAS) violation.258
Such violations are not terribly surprising because the self-serving bias allows
auditors to rationalize and conclude that they can maintain independence in many
situations where third-party observers believe that they cannot and also believe
that breaches of independence are not as serious as third-parties think they are. 59
Not all empirical studies of actual auditor activity produce results so
consistent with the self-serving bias. For example, Louwers recently reported that
auditors' going-concern opinions are primarily a function of client financial
condition.260 Although he admitted that some of his proxies for variables that he
tested were crude and that he found some evidence that larger prospective audit
fees mitigated the tendency to issue a going-concern opinion, Louwers found little
evidence that audit firm-specific factors, such as recent litigation or recent loss of
clients, affected decisions.2 61
Still, the greater weight of evidence clearly indicates that auditors act in a
self-serving manner.2 62 Due to the fact that, in auditing, the appearance of
independence is arguably as important as the fact of independence,263 perceptions
of others cannot be overlooked. Most knowledgeable observers seem to believe
what the studies suggest-that auditor independence and objectivity are affected
by auditors' self-interest in that, for example, the more revenue coming from a
257 See generally Joseph V. Carcello et al., Inappropriate Audit Partner Behavior: Views
ofPartners and Senior Managers, 8 BEHAV. RES. IN ACCT. 244 (Supp. 1996).
258 Id. at 266.
259 Michael Firth, Perceptions of Auditor Independence and Official Ethical Guidelines,
55 Accr. REv. 451,462 (1980) (reporting results of extensive survey in the United Kingdom).
260 Timothy J. Louwers, The Relation between Going-Concern Opinions and the
Auditor's Loss Function, 36 J. ACCr. RES. 143, 154 (1998).
261 Id. at 152.
262 Studies show that, unsurprisingly, even auditors' lobbying efforts are self-serving.
Marsha Puro, Audit Firm Lobbying before the Financial Accounting Standards Board: An
Empirical Study, 22 J. ACC. RES. 624, 645 (1984) (finding auditors' lobbying activity before
FASB consistent with their own self-interest). See also John W. Hill & Robert W. Ingrarn,
Selection of GAAP or RAP in the Savings and Loan Industry, 64 ACCr. REV. 667, 678 (1989)
(concluding that auditors' willingness to allow their S&L clients to adopt the alternative RAP
accounting method was "influenced by their perceptions of [RAP's] key role in maintaining the
continued existence of their S&L clients").
263 Article IV of the AICPA Code of Ethics provides that "[a] member in public practice
should be independent in fact and appearance when providing auditing and other attestation
services." AICPA CODE OF ETHICS art. IV (1988) (emphasis added).
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client, the more likely auditors are to give in to client pressure for improper
accounting treatment 264
264 Professor Gul studied bankers in New Zealand, finding that the bankers perceived that
the size of the audit fee and, to a lesser extent, the size of consulting fees, affected auditors'
ability to resist management pressures for improper accounting treatment. Ferdinand A. Gul,
Size ofAudit Fees and Perceptions ofAuditors 'Ability to Resist Management Pressure in Audit
Conflict Situations, 27 ABACUS 162,167 (1991).
Knapp surveyed senior loan officers in the United States and found that they believed a
client in good financial condition is more likely to obtain its preferred audit outcome in an audit
conflict situation than is a client in poor financial condition, especially where the conflict issue
is not dealt with in precise terms by the technical standards. Michael C. Knapp, Audit Conflict:
An Empirical Study of the Perceived Ability of Auditors to Resist Management Pressure, 60
ACMr. REV. 202, 208 (1985). His study also found that competitive conditions in the audit
market and provision of consulting services increased perceptions of audit conflicts being
resolved in favor of the client Id However, the effect was not nearly as strong as that found in
Shockley's study. Compare with Randolph A. Shockley, Perceptions of Auditors'
Independence: An Empirical Analysis, 56 ACC. REV. 785, 798 (1981). Shockley set up an
experimental task, using as subjects auditors from big and medium-sized firms and financial
statement users, such as commercial loan officers and financial analysts, learning that they
perceived a higher risk of loss of independence when the auditor (a) operated in a competitive
environment, (b) offered consulting as well as auditing services, and (c) was a smaller firm. Id.
Numerous other studies addressing the perception issue have been reported, yielding
contradictory results. See Ronald V. Hartley & Timothy L. Ross, MAS and Audit
Independence: An Image Problem, J. Acer., Nov. 1972, at 42, 44 (reporting that sizable
percentages of both CPAs and financial analysts expressed concern over the conflict created by
performing both consulting and auditing services for the same client); D. Jordan Lowe & Kurt
Pany, CPA Performance of Consulting Engagements with Audit Clients: Effects on Financial
Statement Users'Perceptions and Decisions, AUDrrING: J. OF PRAc. & TEORY, Fall 1995, at
35,49-50 (finding that if enough safeguards are imposed, the appearance of independence may
not be impaired); Sue McKinley et al., An Examination of the Influence of CPA Firm Type,
Size, and MAS Provision on Loan Officer Decisions and Perceptions, 23 J. Acr. RES. 887,
887 (1985) (reporting study finding that provision of MAS services did not impair loan officers'
perceptions of independence and noting that the finding was "contrary to all available research
of which we are aware"); Kurt Pany & Philip M. J. Reckers, MAS, Auditing and Your
Orientation, CPA J., Feb. 1988, at 70, 72 (surveying financial analysts and finding that they
tended to feel, at least under extreme conditions, that performance of MAS services could
impair independence); Kurt Pany & Philip M. J. Reckers, Within- Vs. Between-Subjects
Experimental Designs: A Study of Demand Effects, AUDING: J. OF PRAC. & THEORY, Fall
1987, at 39, 39 (finding that in within-subjects experimental design, subjects expressed concern
that MAS performance impairs independence but did not in between-subjects experiment
design); Kurt Pany & M. J. Reckers, Auditor Independence and Nonaudit Services: Director
Views and Their Policy Implications, 2 J. ACCr. & PUB. POL. 43, 60 (1983) (finding that
directors perceived independence problems with the simultaneous provision of audit and
consulting services and that those problems were perceived to be more serious as the size of
nonaudit services grew).
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E. Studies ofIndividual Auditor Self-Interest
Most of the studies and results adverted to have assumed that if it were in the
accounting firm's self-interest to keep a client, it would also be in the best interest
of the individual auditors making the decisions. While there is probably a
substantial identity of interest between auditors and their firms, if agency theory
counts for anything, some analysis of auditors as individuals is warranted. If
individual auditors are self-serving, this phenomenon should also influence audit
outcomes.
Individual auditors should generally wish to please their superiors and
thereby improve their chances of continued employment, pay raises, promotions,
and even partnership. The self-serving bias would not predict that auditors would
blatantly flout the law, court disciplinary actions and lawsuits, and engage in other
potentially self-destructive behavior in order to please superiors. In ambiguous
cases, however, the tendency to please should be there, and studies show that it is.
Trompeter studied auditor compensation schemes and learned that if
auditors' compensation were tied closely to client retention, they would be less
likely to require clients to downwardly adjust their clients' claimed income than
auditors whose compensation was not based on incentives. 265 Unsurprisingly, the
tendency was greater the more ambiguous the relevant General Accounting and
Auditing Procedures (GAAP) provision appeared to be.2 66
DeZoort and Lord studied obedience pressure in a laboratory setting and
found that "[a]uditors who received inappropriate instructions from either a
manager or partner were significantly more likely to violate professional norms or
standards than auditors under no pressure."267 Overall, as the authors noted, their
results indicate "that auditors may have a tendency to compromise their
professionalism when faced with inappropriate instructions. 2 68
In a laboratory study of compliant behavior of subordinate auditors, Tan and
her colleagues found that the risk assessments of superior auditors significantly
influenced the risk assessments of their subordinates and the amount of cognitive
2 65 Trompeter, supra note 218, at 63-64.
266 Id. at 66.
267 F. Todd DeZoort & Alan T. Lord, An Investigation of Obedience Pressure Effects on
Auditors'Judgments, 6 BEHAv. RES. iN Accr. 11, 11 (Supp. 1994).
268 Id. Because attitudes toward authority did not have a significant impact on the authors'
findings, id, a self-serving desire seems to be playing a greater role in this phenomenon than
the blind obedience to authority that is often observed in psychology studies. See generally
Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PsYCHOL. 371(1963) (famous study demonstrating subjects' willingness to inflict apparently serious electric
shocks when asked to do so by authority figures).
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effort exerted by the subordinates. 269 In other words, once subordinate auditors
learn the preferences of their superiors, they tend to quickly align their views with
those of their superiors and to not waste too much cognitive effort in an attempt to
learn whether those views are accurate.270 Several other studies have found
evidence of this "acceptability heuristic"--the aligning of subordinate auditors'
preferences to match those of the superiors to whom they are accountable.
271
Such actions are generally consistent with the self-serving bias,272 but often not
with concepts of objective and independent auditing.
Just as people need to think well of themselves, they want others to think well
of them and therefore "[t]here is tendency--underscored in the research on
anticipatory regret in decisionmaking-to make choices in a way that bolsters
both one's external and self-image."2 73 People spend a lot of effort being their
own public relations agents in what is called "impression management." 2
74
269 Christine E.L. Tan et al., Auditor Judgments: The Effects of the Partner's Views on
Decision Outcomes and Cognitive Effort, 9 BEHAV. RES. IN ACCT. 157, 169-70 (Supp. 1997).
270 Id. at 170.
271 See Thomas A. Buchman et al., Accountability and Auditors' Judgments about
Contingent Events, 23 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCr. 379, 394 (1996) (finding no significant differences
in choice of disclosure of litigation, but finding that experienced auditors accountable to clients
chose unqualified opinions while those accountable to partners chose qualified opinions in
laboratory test case); Michael Gibbins & James D. Newton, An Empirical Exploration of
Complex Accountability in Public Accounting, 32 J. ACcr. RES. 165, 183 (1994) (reporting
results of survey in which accountants reported feeling "strong accountability pressure" to do
what their superiors or clients wished); Mark E. Peecher, The Influence of Auditors'
Justification Processes on Their Decisions: A Cognitive Model and Experimental Evidence, 34
J. Accr. REs. 125, 136-39 (1996) (finding that knowing justified preferences affected auditors'
acceptance of client explanations and decision to search for other alternatives when the client
was perceived as higher-integrity, but had little effect when the client was lower-integrity).
272 It is certainly not the case that auditors are unique in this regard. Several studies find
this phenomenon generally. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social and Cognitive Strategies
for Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALrrY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 632, 638 (1989) (finding that "subjects who knew the views of the audience
coped by shifting their public attitudes toward those of the anticipated audience").
273 Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 63, at 429 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
274 "Impression management" includes "those behaviors individuals employ to protect
their self-images, influence the way they are perceived by significant others, or both." Sandy J.
Wayne & Robert C. Liden, Effects of Impression Management on Performance Ratings: A
Longitudinal Study, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 232,232 (1995).
Impression management is used, often successfully, in a variety of circumstances. See
David F. Caldwell & Charles A. O'Reilly Ill, Responses to Failure: The Effects of Choice and
Responsibility on Impression Management, 25 ACAD. MGMT. J. 121, 134 (1982) (reporting that
'"vhen confronted with failure, decision makers may attempt to justify their position through
impression management"); Wayne & Liden, supra, at 250 (finding that "a subordinate's use of
impression management early in the relationship with a supervisor induces liking and
perceptions of similarity, which in turn influence performance ratings made later.'); David B.
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Auditors, like others, use impression management techniques in a way that
impedes objectivity. Applying persuasion literature, Rich and his colleagues noted
that audit report "[p]reparers ... are likely to view each audit engagement as an
opportunity to manage their reputation in the reviewer's mind because a
preparer's standing within the firm, as well as promotions and pay raises, will be
strongly related to performance evaluations made by the reviewer.'2 75 The
authors noted :
[P]reparers may fail to report material evidence, sign off on an audit program step
without actually performing that step, fabricate supporting evidence or otherwise
falsify results in extreme cases of perceived pressure to support the client's position.
While it is hoped and expected that deceptive behaviors (e.g., signing off on
procedures not performed) would be relatively uncommon, they are not unheard of
and they have obvious and potentially severe implications for audit effectiveness. 276
It is not surprising that auditors do try to please their superiors. 277 Other
authors have observed that "auditors who know that their supervisors favor 'ready
acceptance' of clients' nonerror explanations for account balance fluctuations
likely embrace such explanations with little circumspection-perhaps without
considering a single error or fraud as an alternative explanation.'u 78 Although it
clearly overstates the case, some researchers have characterized auditing as an
exercise in "CYA,"279 in "marshalling evidence to justify or defend a choice that
Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and
Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581,
1594-96 (1998) (finding that associates in law firms often either inflate or deflate the hours they
bill for working on projects, depending on whether they wish to look as if they are working
very hard or working very efficiently).
275 jay S. Rich et al., The Audit Review Process: A Characterization firom the Persuasion
Perspective, 22 Accr., ORGs. & Soc'Y 481, 491-92 (1997).
2 7 6 Id at 492.
277 Rich, et al., note:
[S]ome reviewers may be known by [work paper] preparers to have a preference for
supporting the client's position in low audit-risk situations. When faced with such a reviewer in
a low-risk situation, the preparer may shift to an evidence-marshalling mode. Such a shift would
be consistent with the accountability literature's notion of a "social politician." Importantly,
although this strategy may enhance the preparer's reputation as perceived by the reviewer, audit
effectiveness may be negatively affected by the preparer's orientation toward merely giving the
reviewer what the preparer perceives the reviewer to want.
Id. at 494 (citation omitted).
2 78 Peecher, supra note 271, at 127 (citing Eric Hirst & Lisa Koonce, Audit Analytical
Procedures: A Field Investigation (1995) (Working Paper, University of Texas)).
279 Michael Gibbins, Propositions About the Psychology of Professional Judgment in
Public Accounting, 22 J. Accr. RES. 103, 117 (1984) [hereinafter Gibbins, Propositions]
1652 [Vol. 61:1597
is preferred by the auditee or by some other party to whom the auditor is
accountable,"2 80 such as a supervisor.
Loewenstein has provided a slightly amplified explanation of the difficulties
that individual auditors face:
First the people who will be hurt by any misrepresentation of information are
statistical [in that the auditor does not know them personally-they are merely
numbers on a list of investors]. Many of them might lose a small amount of money; it
isn't clear who will do so; and there is some chance that no one will be adversely
affected by a minor misrepresentation. In contrast the auditor is likely to be
intimately acquainted with those who would be hurt by a negative ("qualified")
opinion on an audit. Second, the negative consequences of a qualified opinion are
likely to be immediate-loss of the client's friendship, likely loss of the contract and
possible unemployment-whereas the effects of a false negative (an unqualified
report where qualification is merited) are likely to be delayed in time. Third, auditors
form an ongoing working relationship with the organizations they audit and any
deterioration in the audited company is likely to unfold gradually. Auditors may
unknowingly adapt to small changes year after year in the company's financial
practices. Fourth, financial records are inherently ambiguous, so it is very easy for an
auditor to rationalize arriving at a judgment that is consistent with self-interest rather
than with the actual financial figures. In sum, if one wanted to create a business
setting that would virtually guarantee unethical behavior, it would be dificult to
improve on the existing case of independent auditing.28 1
IV. APPROPRIATE SEC RESPONSES To Tim SELF-SERVING BIAS
Although the self-serving bias is pervasive, persistent, and influential, it is not
omnipresent and omnipotent. Every day people pass on many opportunities to act
in self-serving ways that would be dishonest or injurious to others. The reasons
("public accounting has been described as having a 'negative sanction' environment where the
penalties for error are stronger motivators than are the rewards for positive results.").
280 Ir Solomon & Michael D. Shields, Judgment and Decision-Making Research in
Auditing, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING
137, 168 (Robert H. Ashton & Alison H. Ashton eds., 1995). See also Gibbins, Propositions,
supra note 279, at 118 ("Because of the importance of justification and the presence of
retrospective rationalization, public accountants' explanations of their own judgments will be
biased toward their perceptions of acceptable ways of making judgments."); Donald C.
Langevoort, Commentary: Stakeholder Values, Disclosure, and Materiality, 48 CATH. U. L.
REV. 93, 96 (1998) ("Psychologists have also shown that people's reaction to being held
accountable can be as much as anything to engage in window-dressing-anticipating the
reaction of the audience and seeking plausible justifications for the otherwise desired course of
action.").
281 Loewenstein, Skewed Tradeoffs, supra note 22, at 226 (emphasis added). See also
Max H. Bazerman et al., The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, 38 SLOAN MGMT. REV.
89, 90-91 (Summer 1997) (expressing similar sentiments).
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for their restraint range from fear of legal consequences to ethical and religious
principles.
The specific evidence adduced in Part I indicated that the self-serving bias
currently creates for auditors the potential for significant objectivity and
independence problems. What factors restrain auditors from violating professional
rules with reckless abandon every time the opportunity presents itself? After all,
despite the significant problems with earnings management and audit failures
referred to earlier, the audit profession is generally quite honest and strives for
efficiency and accuracy.
The challenge is either to produce an audit profession that is willing to
sacrifice its best interests for the investing public's (unlikely) or to align these two
interests (difficult but possible). This section looks at the various candidates for
achieving those goals.
A. Ethical Constraints
Some hope that ethical constraints will sufficiently serve to minimize
inappropriate auditor behavior motivated by the self-serving bias.282 However, as
noted earlier in the article, while ethical principles do constrain human behavior,
their impact is often weak and uneven. Studies of auditors find that they are all too
human in this regard. For example, as noted earlier, Shaub and Lawrence's study
of ethics, experience, and professional skepticism found that the skepticism
auditors need to do their jobs properly is counteracted when the client is an
important source of referrals to the audit firm's practice development.2 83
Falk and colleagues recently studied the interplay of ethics and audit
practices.2 84 They found, fortunately, that "amoral, self-interested profit-
maximizing behavior [did] not generally characterize the subjects in their
experiment."2 85 However, they also found substantial evidence consistent with
282 One who does so hope is Dr. W. Warner Burke. He prepared an appendix to the
AICPA White Paper on independence and argued that internalization by practitioners of values
such as integrity and objectivity provide the best assurance of true independence. See
W. Warner Burke, Auditor Independence: An Organizational Psychology Perspective, AICPA,
WHrIE PAPER, supra note 10, app. C at 3. See also generally Barry E. Cushing, Economic
Analysis ofAccountants'Ethical Standards: The Case ofAudit Opinion Shopping, 18 J. ACCr.
& PUB. POL'Y 339 (1999) (using economic modeling to suggest a laissez-faire approach,
substituting ethical training for legal regulation).
283 Shaub & Lawrence, supra note 255, at 155. This is one of the reasons that some
ethicists believe that deriving other income from an audit client creates an inherent conflict of
interest. See, e.g., Bowie, supra note 181, at 64 (calling this a "classic conflict of interest
situation").
2 84 See generally Haim Falk et al., Auditor Independence, Self-Interested Behavior and
Ethics: Some ExperimentalEvidence, 18 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL'Y 395 (1999).
285 Id. at 395.
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the self-serving bias, including that "[a]s the probability of losing a client by
disagreeing with the client's decision increases, the frequency of independence
violations increases."2 86 When the probability of losing a client was great, even
monitoring and penalizing auditor behavior did not reduce the independence
violations.2 87 Furthermore, consistent with studies noted earlier, the larger the
potential economic loss, the more likely were auditors to violate independence
rules to avoid it.288
Despite these findings, Falk and colleagues were optimistic about the role
that ethical development could play in improving audit behavior, suggesting that
heightening auditors' awareness of ethical issues might enhance their
independence.289 Improved ethics training is likely to improve auditor
performance, and therefore, that avenue should be pursued vigorously.2 90 But,
current studies of auditor ethics indicate that primary reliance on auditor ethics as
a means of ensuring independence and objectivity is a long way away. One recent
study found a negative association between level of moral development and
employee advancement within audit firms.291 Most other studies of auditor moral
development are no more comforting.2 92 Therefore, McNair is probably correct in
suggesting that "given the limited observability of auditor behavior and
professional judgment, the sole reliance on professional ethics to ensure desirable
behavior is a questionable resource for audit management.12 93
286 Id. at 397.
287 Id.
288 Id at 423.
2 8 9 Id. at 424.
290 See Tsui & Gul, supra note 161, at47 (finding that both levels of ethical reasoning and
personality type affected auditor responsiveness to client pressure for improper accounting
treatment).
291 Lawrence A. Ponemon, Ethical Judgments in Accounting: A Cognitive Development
Perspective, 1 CRmcAL PERsP. IN ACCr. 191,206-08 (1990).
292 See, e.g., Richard A. Bemardi & Donald F. Arnold, Sr., An Examination of Moral
Development within Public Accounting by Gender, Staff Level, and Firm, 14 CONTEMP. Accr.
RES. 652, 663 (1997) (finding that the average moral development scores for male managers of
the Big Five fell between those expected for senior high school and college students, although,
fortunately, female accountants scored somewhat higher); Cohen et al., Exploratory
Examination, supra note 93, at 57 (finding in a cross-cultural study that American auditors were
much more likely to perform questionable acts than Latin American or Japanese auditors ifthe
action would either maintain or expand their client base).
These findings make Dr. Burke's general statements about the significance of firm culture
and the positive impact it can have on auditor behavior sound more hopeful than realistic. See
Burke, supra note 282, at 17-18 (noting that organizational norms can have an influence on the
actions of members).
293 C.J. McNair, Proper Compromises: The Management Control Dilemma in Public
Accounting and Its Impact on Auditor Behavior, 16 ACcr., ORGS. & Soc'Y635, 638 (1991).
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B. Reputational Constraints
If auditors cannot be expected to be selfless, then perhaps it might be in their
own interests to act with objectivity and independence. Moizer, for example,
believes that auditors have a self-interest in being objective and independent
because they can sell their reputations for honesty and objectivity.294 According
to this view, it would be irrational for auditors to be anything other than objective
and independent because clients would then pay them less or not hire them at all.
The literature on reputational intermediaries is well established,295 and there is no
doubt that the Big Five CPA firms have substantial investments in their
reputations. 296
Professor Kinney notes that he often asks members of his CPA audiences
whether their firms' internal independence guidelines are more specific and more
restrictive than the AICPA's or the SEC's. He notes that the answer is invariably
"yes."2 97 From that he concludes, again based on the reputational constraint, that
the particular CPA firms have more to lose than anyone from sloppy auditing.2 98
Although there is no doubt that the reputational constraint affects auditor
behavior, there is reason to doubt its absolute strength. For example, it is not
surprising that, once the SEC sets a floor for independence standards, individual
firms' embodiments of those standards exceed the floor on occasion. But to
assume that once the floor is taken away the standards will remain at that high
level is Pollyannaish.2 99 Reputation is often not a sufficient motivation for
auditors to preserve their own objectivity and independence.300
2 94 Moizer, supra note 17, at 35-43.
295 Auditors act as reputational intermediaries in many settings. See Ronald J. Balvers et
al., Underpricing of New Issues and the Choice of Auditor as a Signal of Investment Banker
Reputation, 63 Accr. REV. 605, 605 (1988) (finding that reputations of both auditor and
underwriter affect underpricing of IPOs); Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business
Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE LJ. 239, 290 (1984) (noting reputational
capital that both law firms and accounting firms sell); Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the
Value ofLawyers, 74 OR. L. REv. 15, 24 (1995) (noting that auditors sell their reputations).
296 In 1996, four members of the Big Five made a total investment of over $170 million in
audit technology and methodology. LECG, supra note 11, at 17. The LECG also argues that the
Big Five make $6 billion a year in audit revenue (almost as much as they make through
consulting) and that they would not risk that stream of revenue by doing anything dishonest. Id.
at 16. However, as shall be explained, it is not at all clear that, when an audit firm is faced with
a client willing to pull its lucrative audit account, the economically prudent thing to do is to
stand up to the client and lose the account.
297 William R. Kinney, Jr., Auditor Independence: A Burdensome Constraint or Core
Value?, Accr. HORIZONs, Mar. 1999, at 69,72-73.
2 98 Id. at 73.
2 99 Ifa group of college football coaches were asked if they observed rules more stringent
than the NCAA's, many of them would likely say that they did. If the NCAA-mandated
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For instance, the rewards that can be gained through audit revenues, and
more importantly through attendant consulting revenues, can outweigh the
damage to reputation. After all, a very high percentage of Big Five income now
derives from consulting revenue,30 1 and these firms often use audit engagements
as "loss leaders" to acquire consulting business.30 2 Given these other fees, it can
be rational for self-serving auditors to risk their reputations to gain lucrative
nonaudit fees.303 Just as coaches of sports teams are more likely to bend the rules
for their star players,304 auditors are naturally more willing to bend the rules for
their star clients. As noted earlier, several studies have noted that the higher the
stream of revenue from a client, the less independent auditors seem to act.305
minimums were taken away, it is equally likely that S.M.U.'s football program of the 1980s,
that earned the only NCAA death penalty thus far prescribed, would soon be a commonly
emulated model.
300 See Prentice, IrrationalAuditor, supra note 160, at 210-17.
301 See Competitive Pressure, IOMA: PARTNERS REPORT FOR LAW FIRM OWNERS, May
1999, at 3, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ALLNWS File (noting that 36% of Big Five
revenue is now derived from consulting).
302 McNair, supra note 293, at 637. A recent survey found that 85% of more than 200
companies surveyed bought consulting services from their auditors. Robert Tie, SEC Renews
Push for More Oversight ofAuditors, J. ACT., July 2000, at 16, 17 (reporting results of survey
by the Financial Executives Institute, but noting that company executives felt they were
selective about which consulting services they purchased).
303 See Steve Bailey & Steven Syre, Coopers & Lybrand Takes Heat for Failing to See
Trouble Sooner, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 1997, at C1 (noting that former SEC chief
accountant Walter Schuetze has described auditors as often just cheerleaders for management
when they are also courting lucrative consulting contracts); Abraham J. Briloff, Old Myths and
New Realities in Accounting, 41 Accr. REV. 484, 490-92 (1966) (criticizing auditors for not
recognizing conflicts of interest in providing both consulting and auditing services
simultaneously); Simon Caulkin, Calling Our Auditors to Order: Conflicts of Interest Raise
Searching Questions, THE OBsERvER, Jan. 16, 2000, Business Pages, at 9 ("[A]n auditing team
is unlikely to rock the boat if, on the back of the audit, its sister divisions are about to sell the
client some much more lucrative consultancy or corporate finance services."); Arthur A.
Schulte, Jr., Compatibility of Management Consulting and Auditing, 40 Accr. REv. 587, 592
(1965) (concluding that serious independence problems exist when auditors provide
Management Advisory Services (MAS)).
304 See Geoff Calkins, Sugar Bowl Notebook COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Jan. 3, 2000, at
D8 (quoting eventual national champion Florida State's coach, Bobby Bowden as admitting
that it looked to him as though he was showing favoritism in stretching team rules to allow star
player Peter Warrick to play in the Sugar Bowl after criminal charges had been brought against
him).
305 See, e.g., Carcello et al., supra note 257, at 266 (reporting survey results that large
client size was a key factor strongly associated -with inadequate workpaper review); Falk et al.,
supra note 284, at 423 (finding that "[t]he larger the economic impact of client loss, the more
likely the independent auditors are to compromise their independent assessment of the
situation"); Krishnan & Krishnan, supra note 237, at 583 (finding in empirical study that an
auditor is more likely to give a qualified opinion if, among other factors, the client's fees are a
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The decision to risk reputation in favor of nonaudit fees may well be a
rational one in light of the fact that (a) unless the client gets into financial trouble,
the auditor will probably not get caught,306 (b) if an audit firm does get caught it
can often preserve its reputation by firing and scape-goating an individual auditor
or two,307 (c) reputational damage will be particularly mild in situations where
smaller percentage of the auditor's client portfolio and the client's growth potential is limited);
Lord, Pressure, supra note 222, at 97-103 (finding that importance of the client in terms of
amount of revenue contributed to the firm was a significant variable in determining
aggressiveness of reporting); Thomas Lys & Ross L. Watts, Lawsuits against Auditors, 32 J.
ACCr. RES. 65, 85 (Supp. 1994) (finding the proportion of revenues generated by the client to
be significantly higher for the litigation sample, consistent with the argument that auditor
independence decreases as the proportion of the audit firm's revenue generated from the client
increases); Shaub & Lawrence, supra note 255, at 155 (finding that "auditors' professional
skepticism was found to be counteracted when the client was important to the audit firm's
practice development"); Wright & Wright, supra note 234, at 33 (reporting that "[a] strong
association was found between the likelihood an adjustment was waived [by the auditor] and
client size, a surrogate for audit fees," although the authors note that other factors than the
auditors' stream of income could account for the correlation). But see James D. Stice, Using
Financial and Market Information to Identify Pre-Engagement Factors Associated with
Lawsuits against Auditors, 66 Accr. REv. 516, 516-17 (1991) (not finding proportion of audit
fees of the client to be a statistically significant variable in a litigation study).
30 6 It is exceedingly cost-ineffective for either clients or third-party users of audit
statements to effectively monitor an audit firm's work. See Larry R. Davis & Daniel T. Simon,
The Impact of SEC Disciplinary Actions on Audit Fees, AuDrrNG: J. OF PRAC. & THEORY,
Spring 1992, at 58, 59 n.1 (stating that "neither [an external user nor an audit client] is likely to
possess the information required to accurately assess audit quality"); Linda E. DeAngelo,
Auditor Size andAudit Quality, 3 J. AcCT. & ECON. 183, 186 (1981) (noting that consumers of
audit reports do not directly observe audit procedures and have little information about the
auditor's incentives); Thomas E. Wilson, Jr. & Richard A. Grimlund, An Examination of the
Importance ofan Auditor's Reputation, AUDMNG: J. OF PRAC. & THEORY, Spring 1990, at 43,
44 ("Unlike consumers of most other goods and services, consumers of audited financial
statements find it difficult to directly assess the quality of the product."). Unless the client goes
into bankruptcy or falters in some other significant way, it is unlikely that the auditor's errors
will ever be detected or lead to meaningful consequences. See Gary Klott, Auditors Feel the
Heat of a New Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMEs, May 13, 1984, § 3, at 1 (quoting Professor Knapp as
observing that there are probably "thousands of problem audits out there but you don't see them
until the company goes belly up or until a massive fraud is uncovered").
Even if the SEC does detect sufficient errors to bring an enforcement action against
auditors, many times the "ultimate sanction" of private civil litigation will not occur. See Sarah
E. Bonner et al., Fraud Type and Auditor Litigation: An Analysis of SEC Accounting and
Enforcement Releases, 73 ACC. REV. 503, 527 (1998) (reporting results that over 40% of
companies in a research sample had no litigation despite SEC enforcement action).
307 Scapegoating a single employee and suggesting that he or she was a "rogue" and that
his or her error was an "aberration" is common by organizations. See, e.g., George M. Cohen,
When Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 289
(1998) (noting that such actions are easier for larger firms); James Denn, Conquest,
Controversy on Wall Street, T]MES UNION (Albany), May 30, 1999, at BI (noting such actions
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accounting standards are ambiguous, 30 8 and (d) empirical evidence demonstrates
that economic consequences of damage to reputation often are minimal, even if
the audit firm does get caught and cannot successfully scapegoat.30 9 Indeed, Big
Five firms have so much reputational capital in the bank that they have
significant, although not complete, immunity to reputational damage. This is
especially so because any client wishing to dump an auditor because of
reputation-damaging litigation against it will quickly find that virtually all the
auditor's competitors have recently suffered similar litigation. 310 As a British
by an investment banking firm). Accounting firms have also used this ploy. See Dan Atkinson,
Accountants Pay $2.5m Settlement, GUARDIAN (Manchester), Jan. 15, 1999, at 23 (noting
PricewaterhouseCoopers's statement that it "regretted and abhorred" the independence rule
violations of certain "rogue individuals" within the firm). Later, it was established that 1,885
PricewaterhouseCoopers's employees had committed a total of 8,064 violations. Elizabeth
MacDonald, Accountant Faces Salvo From SEC, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28,2000, at A3.
308 In a recent study using experimental economic markets methodology, Mayhew and
his colleagues surmised that an accounting firm's reputation would be damaged relatively more
if it flouted relatively certain accounting standards (giving the Sunbeam Corporation's problems
with the SEC as an example) and relatively less in cases involving uncertain application of
accounting standards (giving an America On-Line accounting controversy as an example).
Their study resulted in a conclusion that "auditors facing uncertainty frequently impaired their
independence even though such reporting behavior generated sub-optimal retums for market
participants. This suggests that auditor reputation concerns alone do not deter independence
impairment under conditions of uncertainty." Brian W. Mayhew et al., The Effect ofAccounting
Uncertainty and Auditor Reputation on Auditor Independence (2000) (Working Paper on file
with author).
309 See Davis & Simon, supra note 306, at 66 (finding that after SEC disciplinary actions,
auditors' fees dipped slightly, but only for one year); Michael Firth, Auditor Reputation: The
Impact of Critical Reports Issued by Government Inspectors, 21 RAND J. ECON. 374, 386
(1990) (finding that audit firms disciplined in England continued to gain clients, although they
lost a little bit of market share compared with rivals); Mary S. Schroeder et al., Audit Quality:
The Perceptions ofAudit-Committee Chairpersons and Audit Partners, AUDTING: J. OF PRAc.
& THEORY, Spring 1986, at 86, 91-92 (1986) (finding that client audit committee chairs who
are intimately involved in selecting auditors give no significant weight to litigation involvement
when rating audit quality); Wilson & Grimlund, supra note 306, at 58 (finding only weak
evidence that an auditor's ability to attract new clients is hurt by SEC disciplinary actions taken
against it).
310 In a discussion of reputational damage to law firms from securities suits being filed,
one author recently observed:
Reputational capital is important to accountants as well as to lawyers, but there is a
difference. The accounting profession is dominated by the Big Six [now Five] accounting finns,
all of which have been sued for substantial sums in connection with securities fraud claims,
making differentiation by reputation difficult The difference between Coopers and Lybrand,
which disclosed $145 million in settlements in 1992, and KPMG Peat Marwick, which
disclosed $4.5 million in the same year, is discemable but also debatable, particularly in view of
the fact that, in the following year (1993) Coopers and Lybrand disclosed $25.90 million in
settlements whereas KPMG Peat Marwick disclosed $55.32 million.... [F]or a large
accounting firm a securities suit is simply one more suit to be settled or litigated
2000] SEC AND MDP 1659
OHIO STATELAWJOURNAL
editorialist recently noted, "when the reputation of a firm is attacked most
[accountants] admit, privately, that clients do not care. What happens is simply
that the general reputation of all auditors drops another inch. That is hardly a
sanction when the statutory audit is just that-a legal requirement."311
C. AICPA Self-Regulation
Although the reputational constraint by itself is likely inadequate to well align
auditors' interests with those of the investing public, the self-regulation that the
AICPA performs under the watchful eye of the SEC helps to keep accountants on
the straight and narrow. There can be no doubt that, to a substantial extent, it is to
the profession's best interest to generate effective self-disciplinary rules and to
follow them. However, the evidence presented earlier in this article shows rather
clearly that auditors often tend to breach rules when it appears to them to be in
their interests to do so. Furthermore, professional standards are viewed by
sociologists as involving a huge coincidence of norms and self-interest 312
Indeed, AICPA independence standards remain less stringent than the
SEC's,313 and those standards are largely a product of actions taken to ward off
more drastic government regulation. For example, following 1977 Congressional
hearings and SEC expressions of concern, the audit profession adopted its peer
review process that was clearly instituted in "response to the various
recommendations for self-initiated reform made by the Congress, the
Commission, and others." 314 When the audit profession did little to respond to the
"opinion shopping" problems of the 1980s, the SEC stepped into the breach with
its own proposed rules.315 This prompted the profession to begin its own
initiatives and to urge the SEC to refrain from promulgating final rules until after
Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud:
Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 225,239 (1996).
3 11 Maxwell's Legacy: The Fate of Coopers & Lybrand Suggests New Penalties Are
Needed, FIN. TIMEs (London), Feb. 4, 1999, at 11.
312 See MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFEsSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
71-72 (1977); Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 63, at 414-15 n.76.
3 13 AICPA, WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 37. See also § 210.2-01(b) of Regulation S-
X, 17 CFR § 210.2-01(b) (2000) (showing the SEC's independence rules); SEC CODIFICATION
OF FINANCIAL REPORTING POLICIES §§ 601-602 (1999) (same); AICPA PROF'L STANDARDS
ET § 101 (1997) (setting out the AICPA's independence rules).
3 14 Independent Accountants-Mandatory Peer Review, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,665, 11,667
(proposed Apr. 10, 1987) (citing SEC REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION
AND THE COMMIssION'S OVERSIGHT ROLE, 94th Cong. (2d Sess. 1978)).
3 15 Martin, supra note 10, at 429 ("Unfortunately, the profession has not done a good job
of discouraging [opinion shopping, so] ... the SEC has stepped into the field').
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the private measures had had an opportunity to work 316 As another example,
only after the SEC took action against auditors who borrowed money from clients
during the S&L fiasco of the 1980s, did the AICPA amend its rules to prohibit
almost all types of loans from financial institutions that are audit clients.3 17
Similarly, in the mid-1990s, the Independence Standards Board (ISB) was created
to mollify SEC concern about the conflicts between the audit function and the
many other services accounting finns were beginning to offer audit clients.318
The audit profession has put in place an impressive set of mechanisms and
procedures to help maintain independence and the appearance thereof. From
extensive codes of ethics with arcane rules regarding independence to elaborate
peer review programs, a system is in place that works to preserve independence
most of the time. The system plays an important role in maintaining the high
quality of audits in the U.S. The audit profession justly takes pride in these
developments and consumers of financial statements can take substantial comfort
in their existence. It is only a drumbeat of SEC pressure over the past two
decades, however, that is responsible for the existence of these standards and
procedures. History teaches that counting on the AICPA to rein in auditor
misconduct, in the absence of substantial SEC prodding and oversight, is a
manifestation of the overoptimism bias.3 19
D. The Litigation Constraint
Individual ethical standards, accounting firm investment in reputational
capital, and the guidelines established by the AICPA are all very important to the
current system's regulatory regime. However, the discussion in the preceding
three sections has indicated that alone, and together, they are insufficient to
protect the objectivity and independence of the audit profession. Therefore,
3 16 See Daniel L. Goelzer, The SEC and Opinion Shopping: A Case Study in the
Changing Regulation of the Accounting Profession, 52 BROOK. L. REv. 1057, 1067 (1987)
(noting that commentators on SEC proposed rule changes urged the Commission to wait until
the profession's own response to opinion shopping could be formulated); Smolevitz, supra note
170, at 1122 n.196 (quoting comment letters from accounting firms to the SEC). See also
Rietberg, supra note 18, at 227-231 (indicating that proposed SEC rule changes for the
profession prompted it to institute peer review and second-partner review, to rotate audit
partners every seven years, and to conduct annual quality-control reviews).
3 17 Ernst & Young Settles SEC Case Alleging Lack of Auditor Independence, BNA
SECURrlES LAW DAILY, Mar. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNASLD File.
318 j. Gregory Jenkins, A Declaraton of Independence, J. Accr., May 1999, at 31 ('The
system needed fixing, and the SEC required a solution:").
319 It has been suggested that "the [accounting] profession [in Great Britain] is less
concerned with developing, promulgating and enforcing effective accounting standards in the
public interest than with giving the appearance of so doing.' David Lyall & Robert Perks,
Create a State Auditing Board?-Yes . . ., ACCT., June 1976, at 34, 35.
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despite the common sense appeal of a columnist's recent argument that
"[c]reating hostages to litigation is a lousy way of incentivizing proper
behavior,"320 there has long been anecdotal evidence that the potential for civil
and criminal litigation is the best, and perhaps, only method of inducing auditors
to do their jobs properly.32' The self-serving bias literature would predict that
increased likelihood of litigation and increased penalties stemming from detection
would tend to improve auditor performance by aligning their interests more
directly with the interests of those who benefit from accurate financial reporting.
Many of the empirical studies noted earlier in this article for other propositions
reached just this conclusion. Indeed, substantial empirical evidence indicates that
greater litigation risk (higher chance of detection or higher penalties or both) has
many beneficial effects on auditor conduct.322
320 Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Abused Accountants Say 'Take This Job and...,'
WALL ST. J., Jan. 19,2000, at A23.
321 Bernard Black has noted that "[e]xperience teaches that at least some legal liability is
an important buttress for the accounting firm's concern for reputation," noting:
The needed liability risk doesn't have to be great. I make no claim that aggressive
American style class action litigation against accounting firms is necessary or even desirable...
But if there is no liability risk, the temptation for even the largest accounting firms to squander
reputation to gain a client will always be present and will sometimes be accepted.
Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Stock Markets: The
Nontriviality of Securities Law (Sept. 1999) (Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in
Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 179). See also Ellen Benoit, A Gentleman's Game,
FIN. WORLD, Sept. 22, 1987, at 18, 29 (noting that litigation may be "the only thing that can
really force auditors to be tough"); Abraham Briloff, Accountants'Bottom Line: Home Free,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 19, 1993, at 83 ('There is nothing like a conviction to concentrate the mind.
That is the only kind of penalty which cannot be transferred [by an auditor] to an insurance
company, to the tax collector, to clients, or to society."); Dan L. Goldwasser, State of the
Accounting Profession 1994, in AccOuNTANTs' LIAnBnITY 9, 11 (PLI 1994) (noting that
mounting liability claims have "been the prime moving force behind enhancements [in]
professional standards, changes in the level of accounting education and on-the-job training!);
C. W. Nobes, Summary and Highlights of Chapters Four to Seven, in ACCOUNTANTS'
LABLrry IN mE 1980s: AN INTERNATIONAL VIEW 31, 37 (E.P. Minnis & C.W. Nobes eds.,
1985) ("One response to increasing litigation has been a growing emphasis on quality."); E.P.
Minnis, ProfessionalLiability After Hedley Byrne, in ACCOUNTANTS' LIABIrrY IN mE 1980s:
AN INTERNATIONAL VIEW, supra, at 13, 26 (noting that British expert Paul Rutteman "sees the
improvement in [audit] quality ... in recent years as a direct by-product of the legal problems
[of accountants]").
322 Concomitantly, the self-serving bias would assume that less litigation pressure would
mean less motivation for auditors to adhere tightly to proper procedures. Observers of the audit
industry believe this to be the case. Knapp hypothesized that "[a]n audit firm that realizes it has
little risk of legal exposure, due to the client's excellent financial condition, may be less
motivated to resist management pressure." Knapp, supra note 264, at 204. His study
determined that senior loan officers who often used audit reports believed this to be true. Id at
208.
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The audit profession itself admits that "exposure to legal liability provides a
powerful deterrent to compromising independence." 323 Studies have indicated
that higher litigation risk induces auditors to exert greater effort324 and to plan
more thorough audits.325 Litigation risk also affects the audit standards auditors
choose for their clients. Hill and Ingram empirically studied selection of standards
and its interaction with auditor choice in the savings and loan industry.326 In the
early 1980s, S&Ls were given the option to switch from GAAP accounting to
RAP (regulatory accounting principle) accounting. RAP accounting is much more
aggressive than GAAP accounting, and because the S&L industry was already in
shaky financial shape, auditors had incentive to oppose adoption of RAP by their
clients. Hill and Ingram found, however, that they generally did not do so. They
suggest that the auditors' worries about litigation were more than counterbalanced
"by their perceptions of [RAP accounting's] key role in maintaining the continued
existence of their savings and loan clients." 327 One suspects that had accounting
firms possessed keener insight into the litigation risk they truly faced because of
their S&L work, they would have behaved much differently.
Litigation risk affects application of audit standards, as well as their choice.
Other studies indicate that if the threat of litigation is high, auditors tend to require
conservative reporting and justify that requirement with conservative
interpretations of accounting standards, but that if the threat of litigation is only
moderate, auditors tend to permit aggressive reporting and justify their stance
with aggressive interpretations of the same standards.328 As Farmer and his
323 AICPA, WHrrE PAPER, supra note 10, at4.
324 Julianne Nelson et al., Legal Services and the Market for Auditing Services, 3 J. Accr.,
AUDITNG & FIN. 255, 277 (1988) (concluding, based on mathematical modeling of the auditor-
client relationship, that "increases in auditor liability lead to increases in both auditor effort and
fees").
325 Judith C. Walo, The Effects of Client Characteristics on Audit Scope, AUDrrlNG: J. OF
PRAC. & THEORY, Spring 1995, at 115, 123 (finding evidence "that auditors do impound
business risk assessments [i.e., threat of suit] into their scope [of audit] judgments").
326 Hill & Ingram, supra note 262, at 667.
3 27 d at 678 (noting also that it is an "open question as to whether auditor decisions are
independent of their clients' preferences and/or financial welfare").
Other direct support for the existence of a self-serving bias, and indirect support for the
impact it has on auditors, comes from empirical studies showing that management-controlled
companies select different accounting methods (that favor managers) than owner-controlled
companies. See Dan S. Dhaliwal et al., The Effect of Owner Versus Management Control on the
Choice ofAccounting Methods, 4 J. Accr. & ECON. 41, 52 (1982).
328 See DeZoort & Lord, supra note 267, at 54 (citing two working papers by Lord
finding that auditors are more likely to accept the aggressive financial reporting practices of a
client in strong financial shape than one in weak financial shape whose bankruptcy would likely
spark litigation); Hackenbrack & Nelson, supra note 219, at 52 ("We found that auditors tend to
make the reporting decisions favored by their incentives and apply the vague language in
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colleagues found, "the threat of litigation is a demonstrated important factor that
appears to affect auditors' willingness to take stands opposing a client's proposed
accounting treatments. '329
Detecting fraud or other problems with the client's financial statements is
only step one. The subsequent issue is: will the auditor report them? "The
qualification decision involves economic tradeoffs because auditors who qualify
too frequently risk losing clients and those who seldom qualify are exposed to
lawsuits and loss of reputation." 330 Krishnan and Krishnan found that the more
likely an auditor would be sued for false reporting, the more often a qualified
opinion would be issued where one was wananted. 331 Other studies indicate that
with a higher litigation risk, auditors are more likely to resign or refuse accounts
where the risk of misrepresentation of the client's financial status is high. Menon
and Williams studied retention/disengagement decisions from 1990 to 1996 in the
United States and concluded that "auditors' decisions to resign or to decline
reappointment are a function of the audit error cost, which reflects the expected
losses to the auditor when the probability of misrepresentation is high. '332
Whereas the accounting industry has been successfully lobbying Congress for
legislation to protect its members from litigation by claiming that the auditors
have been forced to refuse to audit certain litigation-prone industries, thus
endangering their financial viability, Menon and Williams found that "the
decision to resign or decline reappointment seems to be driven by the likelihood
financial accounting standards in a manner consistent with the reporting position they
selected.").
It is interesting that accountants make reporting decisions favored by their clients when
they act as tax professionals. See, e.g., C. Brian Cloyd, The Effects of Financial Accounting
Conformity and Client Risk Attitude on Recommendations of Tax Preparers (1993) (University
of Texas Working Paper, on file with author); Cuccia et al., supra note 198, at 243-44 (finding
that replacing vague standards with precise standards does not mitigate aggressive reporting
when tax accountants are incentivized to aggressively report); Johnson, supra note 201, at 1.
Not surprisingly, a higher litigation risk induces tax accountants to be more conservative in
their approach to client requests to make aggressive tax claims. See, e.g., Kathryn Kadous &
Anne M. Magro, The Effects of Exposure to Practice Risk on Tax Professionals' Judgments
and Recommendations (Dec. 1999) (unpublished Working Paper on file with author).
329 Farmer et al., supra note 210, at 10.
Analogously, Matsumura and Tucker reported that the results of their economic
experiment indicated that "increasing the auditor's penalty ... increased fraud detection" by
auditors. Ella Mae Matsumura & Robert R. Tucker, Fraud Detection: A Theoretical
Foundation, 67 Accr. REV. 753, 754 (1992).
330 Dopuch et al., supra note 241, at 432-33.
331 Krishnan & Krishnan, supra note 237, at 577, 583.
332 Krisnagopal Menon & David D. Williams, Error Cost and Auditors' Termination
Decisions, 12 J. AuDmnIG, Accr. & FIN. 95, 121 (1999).
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that the client's financial statements will contain misrepresentations that are likely
to subsequently be detected, rather than by the client's industry.' '333
All in all, it has been concluded that "[a]lthough [litigation risk] is a pressure
toward conservative behavior, it is also a pressure toward high-quality audits. '334
It is no surprise then that Nichols and Price argued a long time ago that of the
possible alternatives to improving auditor performance, the one holding the most
promise is reducing the auditor's and/or client's flexibility of action by increasing
the cost of inappropriate actions.3 35
It is worth noting that auditor litigation risk has been significantly reduced
recently due to a siring of pro-defendant federal court decisions in securities
cases336 and successful lobbying by the accounting and high tech firms to induce
passage of favorable federal legislation.337 This is not necessarily a bad thing, for
accounting industry claims of a "liability crisis" in the early 1990s were quite
plausible, and litigation is a blunt instrument for achieving policy goals.338 SEC
enforcement is a scalpel preferable to private class action securities' suits relative
333 Id.
334 LAWLER & RHODE, supra note 166, at 187. See also Farmer et al., supra note 210, at
10-11 (noting that threat of liability serves to provide countervailing pressure in favor of
observation of independence standards).
335 Nichols & Price, supra note 166, at 345.
336 There are several favorable court decisions relevant to federal securities. See generally,
e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (drastically reducing the coverage of§ 12(2)
of the Securities Act of 1933); Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)
(eliminating aiding and abetting cause of action under § 10(b)); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507
U.S. 170 (1993) (largely eliminating auditor liability under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S.
350 (1991) (dramatically reducing the length of the statute of limitations under § 10(b)); Pinter
v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988) (reducing the liability of auditors under § 12 of the Securities Act
of 1933 by giving narrow definition to the term "seller").
The accounting profession has won important state law victories as well. Auditor third
party liability has been dramatically reduced by court decisions, see, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young
& Co., 834 P.2d 745, 774 (1992) (replacing "reasonable foreseeability" scope of negligence
liability with more restrictive "Restatemenf' approach), and legislative action. See, eg., ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-114-302 (Michie Supp. 1999) (adopting an even narrower "privity" approach).
33 7 The two most important such acts are: the Public Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA), 109 Stat. 737 (current version with additions and amendments at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-
78 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (Supp.I 1995)), which erected numerous barriers to a § lOb-5 class
action plaintiff's recovery, and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
(SLUSA), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(p), 78bb(f) (Supp. 1996) (reinforcing PSLRA reforms
by largely eliminating option of plaintiffs' attorneys to file class action securities fraud suits in
state courts).
338 See generally Adam C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class
Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999)
(highlighting weaknesses and disadvantages of litigation and suggesting alternative methods of
discouraging fraud).
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meat ax. Still, the bottom line is that more than ethical constraints, reputational
capital, or self-regulation, the threat of SEC sanctions and of civil money
judgments accounts for the relatively sterling record of the audit profession.
E. Governmentalizing the Audit Function
It is plausible to conclude that auditor interests can never be properly aligned
with audit report consumer interests so long as the auditees are paying the
auditor's bill.339 Therefore, over the years, people have occasionally suggested
that the audit function should become a governmental service.3 40 Given that some
have lamented that "auditing is no longer considered to be a value-added activity
for much of the profession," 341 perhaps it is time to revisit this suggestion.
However, in an economic world where privatization is the dominant
economic trend, this tide-resisting change is likely too great especially because
the benefits of making audit a public function are too dubious. Government
takeover of the audit profession is too great a change and too inconsistent with
America's free enterprise system to seriously contemplate at this time.3 42
F. Separating the Audit Function
A more limited approach to the conflict of interest and its damage to
objectivity and independence created by the provision of consulting services to
audit clients has been the separation of functions. Hence, in 1990, accounting firm
Arthur Andersen spun off Andersen Consulting to create a demarcation between
the audit and consulting functions.343 PricewaterhouseCoopers has announced
3 39 See Elizabeth MacDonald, How a Ballpark Tip Evolved into a Burden for One of the
Big Five, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2000, at Al (quoting a Big Five partner as saying "[t]he real
conflict is that we get paid by the companies we're auditing").
340 See, e.g., Lyall & Perks, supra note 319, at 34 (suggesting nationalization of the
British audit profession).
341 Robert G. Ruland, Commentary on Inappropriate Audit Partner Behavior: Views of
Audit Partners and Senior Managers, 8 BEHAV. REs. iN Accr. 269, 269 (1996) (also noting
that today "there is an emphasis on [good] client service that is alien to the skepticism and
diligence required of a good auditor").
342 Harvey Hendrickson & Reza Espahbodi, Second Opinion, Opinion Shopping and
Independence, CPA J., Mar. 1991, at 26.
343 See Arthur Andersen & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 79,484, at 77,457 (Jul. 25, 1990). Of course, there was so much money to be
made in consulting that tension between the less profitable Arthur Andersen and the more
profitable Andersen Consulting has been substantial, leading Arthur Andersen to go back into
consulting in competition with its related branch. See Roger 0. Crockett, Next Stop, Splitsville,
Bus. WK., Jan. 18, 1999, at 100 (discussing attempts by Andersen Consulting and Arthur
Andersen to settle their competitive differences).
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plans to separate its consulting business from its audit and tax business,344 and so
has KPMG.345 Ernst & Young has announced a plan to sell its consulting
business to Cap Gemini Group.34 6 All three separations were the result of heavy
SEC pressure, and the resulting trend is a sensible one.
Today, only a small minority of accountants do audit work.347 As noted
earlier, the audit aspect of the profession has become disrespected to some degree.
It is a less desirable career track. The SEC-mandated "annual audit is a federal
gravy train that hardly pays its way anymore."348 Accounting firms use it as a loss
leader to generate profits from related activities and jettison it when it stands in
the way of more lucrative consulting work.349
Perhaps now it is time for all accounting firms to seriously consider spinning
off their audit functions into separate entities. Most of the nonaudit functions do
not require independence. Attest-related activities, such as Webtrust and
ElderCare, could perhaps be spun off along with traditional financial statement
auditing, but firms could segregate attest work from knowledge translation work,
such as tax, accounting, consulting, and other work. Audit work might become
more expensive as the new firms would have to put it on a profitable basis rather
than using it as a loss leader, but it would be worth the cost for auditing to regain
the respectability that the function deserves. Absent SEC pressure, the accounting
profession would prefer not to make such changes, arguing, among other things,
that (a) offering nonaudit services increases the auditor's knowledge of the
client's business and its general business skills and can enhance the overall
sophistication of the firm, and (b) forcing firms doing audits to give up other
forms of revenue makes them more, not less, dependent on fees from individual
audit clients.350 The former argument is plausible, but thus far is mainly
supported by merely anecdotal evidence. It assumes an identity of or
The problems created by this competition were recently settled in a bitter arbitration
dispute that split the two entities that had uneasily co-existed under parent Andersen
Worldwide. See Geanne Rosenberg, Andersen Legal's Strategy Unbowed by Andersen Split,
NAT'LLJ., Aug. 21, 2000, at B8 (describing results of arbitration).
344 Elizabeth MacDonald, PricewaterhouseCoopers Will Divide into Two or More Parts,
Under Pressure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2000, at B8. The announced plan would separate
PricewaterhouseCoopers's audit, business-advisory, and tax businesses from its management-
consulting practice. Id
3 45 See Carole Gould, KPMG Consulting Arm Looks Ready to Fly Solo, N.Y. TDMES, Aug.
13, 2000, § 3, at 8 (describing KPMG's plan to have an initial public offering for its consulting
branch).
346 Kevin . Delaney & Elizabeth MacDonald, Ernst & Young to Sell Business to Cap
Gemini, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29,2000, at C14.
347 PeterD. Fleming, Steering a Coursefor the Future, J. Accr., Nov. 1999, at 35,37.
348 Jenkins Jr., supra note 320, at A23.
349 Id
350 ee ICP, WHTE APE, supra note 10, at 58.
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interrelationship between audit personnel and consulting personnel that probably
does not exist and that would create major independence problems if it did.3 51
The latter argument ignores the fact that when a firm's main source of revenue is
audit work, the reputational constraint will become much more effective than it is
today when audit work is just a minor profit center in the firm.
After this article was accepted for publication, the SEC proposed new rules
that are generally consistent with the suggestions put forth here.352 While easing
restrictions on picayune matters of stock ownership, the proposal would require
auditing firms to more strictly limit their nonaudit services to clients, such as
designing information systems, internal auditing, appraising client assets, and
acting as a broker-dealer.
CONCLUSION
Behavioral literature is increasingly informing legal analysis 53 In this
setting, it indicates that the self-serving bias, although a bounded phenomenon, is
351 One of the arguments that audit firms traditionally made when independence issues
were raised in conjunction with provision of both audit and consulting services is that the staffs
were completely separate. If so, it is not easy to see from where the synergy of knowledge
comes. If it is important for auditors to learn how complex financial systems operate, '"they
should get that experience while serving non-audit clients." John H. Biggs, Auditors and
Consultants Shouldn't Be Too Close, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2000, at A26.
352 Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,
148 (July 12, 2000). The proposal drew some support from within the Big Five firms. See Scott
Hartz, Audit and Advice Should Split, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2000, at A26 (Hartz is global
managing partner for management consulting services at PricewaterhouseCoopers); Louis
Lavelle, Cozying Up to the Ref, BUS. WK., July 31, 2000, at 85 (noting that Emst & Young
generally supported the proposals). For the most part, however, the Big Five was quite hostile to
the proposals. See Nanette Bymes & Mike McNamee, The SEC v. CPAs: Suddenly, It's
Hardball, Bus. WK., May 22, 2000, at 49 (quoting AICPA chair Robert Elliott as saying "we
cannot permit the SEC to bomb the profession back into the Stone Age").
353 See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business
Judgment Rule: Differences in the Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REv. 587, 621-30 (1994)
(analyzing the impact of the hindsight bias on the contrasting rules for judicial review of
decisions of doctors and directors); John C. Coffee Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a
Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV.
1099, 1132-56 (1977) (applying behavioral psychology and organizational behavior research to
the corporate setting); Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive illusions and Their
Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 227-76 (1986) (exploring a broad range of
literature on human decision-making and applying its lessons to various legal matters); Melvin
A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211,213-
59 (1995) (noting how psychological constraints on cognition explain many aspects of contract
law); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique
of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI-KENT L. REV. 23, 35-54 (1989) (offering a broad
look at the fields of psychology and sociology regarding how insights about human behavior
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inescapable in human behavior.354 Both the general literature and the audit-
specific literature bear this out. Auditors, like others, tend to act according to its
dictates. They are more likely to falsify the numbers or simply "look the other
way" when it suits their purposes (e.g., allowing them to keep a lucrative client).
They are more likely to resist client requests to fudge the numbers when that
course of action serves their best interests (e.g., preventing unacceptable litigation
risk). Whether decisions to audit recklessly are conscious or (more often)
subconscious, they are products of the self-serving bias.
Evidence regarding the self-serving bias's impact on auditors should preclude
SEC sanguinity on the MDP issue. Should MDP come to be, it is unlikely that it
would directly generate any huge audit failures. Auditors generally follow the
rules. MDP would provide just one additional source of revenue that likely would
never match the huge stream of computer consulting revenue that already exists.
But although implementation of MDP would not likely cause a sea change in
audit reliability, another step in an unsettling direction would occur. 355 There are
already grounds for concern (e.g., widespread earnings management, shocking
audit failures, etc.). Numerous studies have demonstrated that an important
variable in inducing improper auditor performance is a greater stream of revenue
from the particular audit client. Thus, there is reason to believe that an increased
stream of revenue from MDP would exacerbate existing objectivity and
independence problems.356
can improve economic analysis of law); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL.
L. REv. 1051, 1060-74 (2000) (noting significant flaws in law and economics theory's core
behavioral assumption that people act rationally and suggesting a more nuanced approach);
Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in
Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2094-2142 (1998) (attempting to explain punitive damages with
behavioral insights); see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A
Progress Report, I AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115 (2000) (surveying broadly the implications of
behavioral research for the legal system).
354 Even trained scientists are subject to the self-serving bias. It often affects physicists'
interpretations of their experimental results and for that reason physicists are starting to use
double-blind testing to minimize the effects of the bias. See James Glanz, New Tactics in
Physics: Hiding the Answer, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 4, 2000, at DI ("The problem is, physicists'
natural eagerness to find new effects may lead them, in all innocence, to parse the data or make
the comparisons in slightly biased fashion if they can see the answer as they work").
355 Although lawyers are not this article's focus, opponents of MDP have noted that the
self-serving bias means that MDP may have a "multiplier effect' on conflicts-of-interest and
impose severe pressure on attomeys. Naturally, it will be harder for an attomey, who should
advise a client against an action that the client desperately wishes to take, to do so when the
client is not just a legal client, but an audit and/or consulting client as well. See generally
Submission of Patrick F. McCartan to the American Bar Association's Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice (Apr. 1, 1999), at http'//www.abanetorgcpr/mccartan.html (on file
with The Ohio State Law Journal).
35 6 See supra note 356. As Bazerman and his colleagues have noted:
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As the impact of ethical constraints upon the self-serving bias is uncertain and
uneven, other forces are needed to align auditors' self-interest with the investing
public's best interests. Firm reputational capital and industry (AICPA) standards
are very significant in this regard, but without constant SEC pressure are unlikely
to be adequate. Structural separation of auditing from non-attest tasks and
continued litigation risk are the two most promising avenues for SEC action. The
SEC should not underestimate the influence of the self-serving bias and the
adverse effect upon independence and objectivity in the audit realm that the
advent of MDP could cause.
[Ijhe leading auditors are entities within larger partnerships that include tax and (rapidly
growing) consulting practices. Auditing is becoming less important to the overall profitability of
the leading accounting firms. In many cases, a finn's audit client is also a consulting client, with
the consulting component being far more profitable than the audit. So an unfavorable opinion
risks not only the audit but, potentially, the consulting relationship as vell. In the past, firms
have emphasized the independence of their three components (audit, tax, and consulting). Firms
have been changing their structural form, however, to better integrate services within industries
and for specific clients. Information from one part of the relationship with a client can help the
accounting firm with another component But the risk to independence is also increased.
Imagine how difficult it is for an auditor whose firm has been providing consulting services to a
company to submit a qualified report. Simultaneously playing consultant and watchdog further
confuses the issue of whom the auditors are accountable to and working for.
Bazerman et al., supra note 281, at 93.
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